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**POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS**

**No. 1787**



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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CPCZ DAILY RECALLS SOVIET WORLD WAR II INTERNATIONAL AID

AU291241 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 24 Apr 80 p 4

[Article by Frantisek Nesvatba: "The Liberating Mission of the Soviet Army; On the 35th Anniversary of the Victory Over Fascism"; passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Excerpts] /One of the constantly topical lessons taught by the history of World War II is undoubtedly that, throughout the war, the Soviet Union was giving important assistance to the peoples fighting against German fascism and Japanese imperialism./

Even in the most difficult times the working people in the occupied countries turned with confidence and hope to the Soviet Union and its army. /In their unappeasable opposition to fascism they were convinced that the support of the socialist state, the strength of the Soviet army and the moral-political unity of the Soviet people, led by the Leninist Communist Party, would be the decisive factors, determining the result of the struggle between the forces of social progress and the reaction, and the victory of democracy and socialism./

By its heroic struggle against the Hitlerite wehrmacht in the western areas of the USSR in 1944, the Soviet army was establishing prerequisites for the direct liberation of the peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe. But the Soviet Union's assistance to other peoples was not limited only to the extensive military operations in which the main forces of the fascist coalition were destroyed.

Of immense significance was also the Soviet Union's aid to these peoples in the solution of international political matters on the highest diplomatic level. /Soviet foreign policy during World War II proceeded from Marxist ideology; it was in harmony with the principles of proletarian internationalism and it pursued the interests of the international workers class./

The Soviet Union gave extraordinary assistance to the communist and workers parties in the development of their national liberation fight. During the war outstanding representatives of the European communist and workers parties found asylum in the USSR from the fascist persecution.

The Soviet Union established favorable conditions for the coordinated operations of the partisan movement in European countries against the fascist occupiers in various countries, so that they would become a threat to the rear of the Germany army. Attached to the Ukrainian staff of the partisan movement were representatives of the communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania. In April 1944 this staff also helped the Polish antifascists to organize their own partisan staff, in which experienced Soviet partisans also worked. During Klement Gottwald's visit in May 1944, extensive Soviet assistance to the partisan movement in Slovakia and in the Czech lands was agreed with the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Partisan groups were sent to Czechoslovakia and other countries at the request of the representatives of communist parties. During the year 1944, 53 partisan groups were sent to Slovakia and 11 to the Czech lands. At that time numerous partisan groups were also sent to Poland, Hungary and Romania; detachments of active fighters against fascism then grew up around them.

/One of the significant forms of the USSR's international aid to the enslaved peoples which manifested, on a long-term basis, the Soviet army's liberation mission, was the setting up of foreign military formations on the USSR's territory./ The organization of these units in the USSR was based either on intergovernmental agreements, or proceeded from the request of the patriotic and democratic forces of the occupied countries.

The Soviet Union gave great assistance in the setting-up of Polish people's democratic and antifascist units. With the assistance of the Soviet army command, two divisions were built up from among the Romanian antifascists; they were fully equipped with Soviet armaments. More than 250 Soviet officers cooperated in building them up. Even after the defeat and disintegration of the Royal Romanian Army in August 1944, the Soviet army command granted effective assistance to the group of units of 1st and 4th army, which joined in the war against fascist Germany. The financial and material resources released by the Soviet Union for building up the new Romanian military units totaled in November 1944 more than R31 million. The Romanian units also participated, at the side of the Soviet army, in the liberation of areas in southern Slovakia and southern Moravia.

The Soviet army also significantly helped the Yugoslav people. In 1943 the following units were set up on USSR territory: the 1st Yugoslav Infantry Brigade, a tank brigade and two air force regiments. Apart from that the Soviet Union supported, through arms deliveries, the units of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, which were set up under the LCY's leadership on domestic soil. The financial value of Soviet assistance to Yugoslav patriots amounted on 1 January 1945 to more than R52 million.

Likewise, the Soviet army command gave notable assistance to the Albanian partisans. It was possible to arm three mountain infantry divisions with Soviet weapons. Five Bulgarian infantry divisions could be rearmed from

the means of the Soviet army; in the last period of the war they participated in the fighting against the Hitlerite army. With the Soviet army's aid, two Hungarian infantry divisions and two engineers' brigades for the railroads were set up, as late as 1945; their activities were directed at helping the rear formations of the second Ukrainian front during the Bratislava-Brno and Prague operations.

/The Soviet Union's support for the new liberation armies was a significant part of the international mission of the Soviet army, which fought for the liberation of European and Asian peoples from fascism with the same vigor and determination with which it fought for the liberty of the Soviet Union's peoples./ The effectiveness of the blows delivered to the troops of the fascist coalition by the national liberation armies was the expression of their close combat cooperation with the Soviet army. Even in instances where there was no direct collaboration, the liberation armed forces were making use of the general weakening of the resistance of the fascist troops which was the result of the Soviet army's victorious advance.

The most significant form of the Soviet Union's liberation mission was its extensive strategic operations, carried out in 1944-45 on the territories of states in Central and Southeastern Europe, and in August 1945 also on the territory of Northeastern China and the northern part of Korea.

The Soviet army's liberation mission in Europe and in Asia was accompanied by a number of significant international political acts, through which the USSR documented its peace-loving policy and its determined will not to meddle in other peoples' internal affairs. /In the course of numerous war operations which had to be carried out against the Hitlerite wehrmacht on the territories of states in Central and Southeastern Europe, the Soviet Union and its army proved that they proceed from the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence of peoples and that they are led solely by the endeavor to help the enslaved peoples renew their state sovereignty and direct the fates of their countries according to the people's free will./

In the difficult and stubborn battles, which took place in stages that were determined by the strategic goals of the individual operations, the Soviet army crushed the Nazi troops and in this way decisively contributed to the liquidation of fascist rule in Europe. It thus fulfilled its liberation mission toward the people of Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Its troops also decisively contributed liberating Austria, and even Germany itself, from fascist domination.

The Soviet liberating units were also welcomed by the citizens of Norway and in areas far beyond the polar circle also by the population of the Danish island Bornholm.

The heroic struggle of the glorious Soviet army under the leadership of the Leninist Communist Party against the armies of the fascist coalition was the decisive factor that saved mankind from modern slavery and helped many peoples take the new path of free development.

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### PUJA DEFENDS WARSAW PACT, ASSAILS NATO AGGRESSIVENESS

Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 4, Apr 80 pp 39-48

[Article by Frigyes Puja, Minister of Foreign Affairs: "The Warsaw Pact: An Alliance for Peace"]

[Text] It has been a quarter century since the heads of government of the fraternal socialist countries signed that treaty of alliance, friendship, cooperation and mutual aid which has become known throughout the world by the name of the Warsaw Pact.

#### I.

The antifascist coalition--which defeated fascism in World War II--fell apart not long after the war. A turn took place in the foreign policy of the wartime allies of the Soviet Union--the United States and England. The leading American and English politicians worked out an aggressive, anti-Soviet strategy, the chief goal of which was to stop the spread of and turn back socialism, even at the price of another world war. Winston Churchill laid the ideological foundations of the imperialist block policy. On 5 March 1946, in a speech given at Fulton University in the state of Missouri in the United States, the British conservative leader sounded the trumpet of the cold war, called for a crusade against socialism and announced a program for English-American world rule, as he said, "not only for our time but for the century ahead also..."

The American politicians did not hide the chief aspirations of the foreign policy of the United States under a bushel. The American president Truman announced in 1945, not long after he took the chair as president: "Victory has put before the American people the constant and burning necessity of leading the world." Truman, and other American politicians also, took the position that only that could happen in the world which was permitted by the American ruling class. These ideas were also expressed in the conception of an "American century."

This strategy of world rule prescribed the creation of military bases around the Soviet Union and the people's democratic countries in Europe and the

creation of various military alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949. There was an attempt to improvise a Near East military alliance linked to the North Atlantic Alliance and great pressure was put on the countries of the Near East and Middle East. They established SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, CENTO.

The American strategy in Europe was built primarily on the West German revanchist policy. The American leaders did not even want to hear about a united, peace loving Germany which was consistently democratic in its social-economic foundations because this would have rendered impossible their European plans and would have undermined their aggressive strategy. Thus they left unanswered the rational proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries aimed at a democratic reunification of Germany. They chose another path; they hindered German unity so that a separate state could be created by bringing together the American, English and French zones of occupation. Their goal even then was to arm the German Federal Republic thus created and bring it into NATO. This was the plan which was most important to those acting as midwives at the birth of NATO, and the plan most dangerous from the viewpoint of Europe.

But bringing the West German state into the North Atlantic Alliance did not go smoothly. The memory of the Nazi atrocities committed in World War II still lived freshly in the memories of the European peoples. The American imperialists turned to a detour. First they created the Bonn pact. This document was signed on 26 May 1952 by representatives of the United States, England, France and the German Federal Republic. Their goal was thereby to join the German Federal Republic to themselves and to make impossible in advance the reunification of the two German states.

After the signing of the Bonn pact, on 27 May 1952, the European Defense Community was created with the participation of Belgium, France, Holland, Luxemburg, West Germany and Italy prescribing the creation of a "European army" under a joint command. The meaning and purpose of this agreement was to be able to use the armed forces of the German Federal Republic in a struggle against the socialist countries. But the French parliament rejected the agreement.

Following this, on 23 October 1954, there was the signing of the so-called Paris treaties, which went into effect on 5 May 1955. In actuality these treaties provided a "legal basis" for the arming of the German Federal Republic so that it could join the North Atlantic Alliance and become the chief European force thereof. Thus the American imperialists achieved one of their most important goals in Western Europe.

All of this created an extraordinarily dangerous situation in the European area; the arming of West Germany with American, English and French aid increased the threat of war in Europe. The American imperialists--in conjunction with their reactionary West German allies preparing for revenge, Adenauer and those like him--had to be prevented from involving the world in a thermonuclear war.

It is true that the world situation began to improve somewhat in 1953-1954, primarily thanks to the repeated initiatives of the Soviet Union and other countries. The Korean war came to an end; the Vietnamese people, who had suffered so much, were victorious over the French colonialists in a heroic struggle; the sharpness of the confrontation in the relations of socialist and capitalist countries in Europe was reduced somewhat. But the leading circles of the United States opposed all real aspirations for peace and had no idea of giving up their aggressive strategy. One after another the United States and its allies rejected the proposals of the socialist countries regarding disarmament and measures to further peace. The policy of a military encirclement of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries continued. Together with this the Western powers started a political campaign and a broad propaganda campaign against the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, with the obvious goal of undermining the social system of the socialist countries and discrediting the ideal of socialism.

The socialist countries could not look on such a development of the situation without acting--before all else they could not leave unanswered the inclusion of the FRG into NATO. Their responsibility for the fate of humanity, of peace and of socialism dictated that in addition to their already existing bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual aid they should sign a multilateral treaty of friendship and mutual aid which would make possible the unification and coordination of their political and military efforts. The coordinated policy, united action and, last but not least, common military efforts of the socialist countries had to be opposed to the aggressive policy of imperialism, the revanchist aspirations of the reviving German militarism and the danger of neonazism.

This multilateral treaty came into being in May 1955 in Warsaw. Government delegations of the Albanian People's Republic, the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic and the Soviet Union--all led by the prime minister--signed the Warsaw Pact of 14 May, after a 3 day conference and a profound analysis of the policy of the United States and the capitalist countries in Western Europe. This pact was a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual aid among the states represented at the conference. (The Albanian People's Republic left the Warsaw Pact on 16 September 1968.)

The signers of the pact reaffirmed that "they were aspiring to create a collective European security system which would be based on the participation of any European state without regard to its social and state system and which would make possible the uniting of their efforts in the interest of ensuring peace in Europe." They set down in the first article that "they obliged themselves to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, and to solve their international disputes by peaceful means in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security."

In the second article they announced that "in the spirit of sincere cooperation they were ready to participate in every international action which had as its goal the ensuring of international peace and security and they would turn all their strength to the realization of these goals...striving at the same time to formulate, on the basis of agreement with other states inclined to cooperate in this, effective measures for a general reduction of armaments and for the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons and other weapons of mass destruction." The provisions pertaining to the functioning and organization of the Warsaw Pact note specifically that "If a collective European security system comes into being and if a general European collective security treaty is signed for this purpose--something toward which the Contracting Parties will constantly strive--the present Pact will lose its validity on the day of the going into effect of the general European treaty."

The member states of the Warsaw Pact have never lost sight of the noble goals and principles contained in the treaty and quoted above. These still have as much validity as they did a quarter of a century ago. They are graphic proof of the consistency and of the long range, unwavering, principled foreign policy of the community of socialist countries.

## II.

The history of NATO makes it clear that the North Atlantic Alliance is a military-political organization which in its essence serves the aggressive strategy of the aggressive circles of American imperialism against socialism and progress. It has nothing in common with the defense of peace or the strengthening of security as is so emphasized by the Western propagandists. On the contrary, its political and military line and all its activity thus far have thrown serious obstacles in the path of creating lasting peace and security.

The indisputable lesson of the past 30 years is that this organization was deliberately developed, its conceptions so formed and its leading cadres and staffs so selected as to be able to stubbornly resist the detente process which is unfavorable for it.

From beginning to end the chief content of the activity of the North Atlantic Alliance has been to encourage the arming of the member states, to ensure that it should have a military advantage over the socialist countries. The United States has "sacrificed" the most for this, especially in the first period of the existence of NATO. But later the other member states also were forced to contribute to the common "defense." The weapons expenditures of NATO have increased from year to year, indeed from session to session, and the justification for this was always the same--the "increasing Soviet threat" and the "backwardness" of the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance in the area of armaments.

The essence of the Warsaw Pact is radically different and its activity differs fundamentally also. It must be remembered that the countries founding the

Warsaw Pact, showing a patience virtually unparalleled in history, waited six full years after the creation of NATO to create their own defensive organization! Then, however, they had to act because the Atlantic block, evidencing ever more aggressive behavior, was preparing to attack and start a new war. Thus, since then, one can find in Europe today two military blocks, radically different; but imperialism is responsible for dividing Europe into blocks.

The goal of the one alliance is peace and European security and the protection of that society which the peoples of the socialist countries are building. The Warsaw Pact is a new type of alliance of socialist states, an important factor in the struggle being waged for universal peace and international security. As such it plays a salient role in the defense of the socialist countries, is an effective tool for the united foreign policy activity of the member states and thus well serves both the national interests of the member countries and the general interests of the international worker class. The beautiful sounding declarations of the other alliance have not changed its aggressive, anti-progress goals. The results of detente thus far--for which the socialist countries have struggled since the beginning and in the creation of which the sober and realistic leaders of some capitalist countries have become their partners--were achieved not with the contribution of NATO but rather by overcoming the resistance of NATO.

The Warsaw Pact has military organs too, the task of which is to coordinate the efforts of the member states of a defensive character. But the activity of the most important leading organ of the Warsaw Pact, the Political Advisory Body, and more recently of the Foreign Ministers' Committee is primarily of a political character and before all else serves the strengthening of peace and security and the promotion of disarmament. The facts prove this graphically.

At its first session, 27-28 January 1956 in Prague, the Political Advisory Body recommended that a few European states--including the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and the United States--should agree with one another to create a zone in which the size and position of armed forces should be regulated by a separate agreement of the interested states. The participants noted that it would be desirable to create a special zone incorporating both parts of Germany in which armaments would be limited, under supervision. An agreement on this could prescribe the withdrawal of foreign troops from both parts of Germany or limitations of their numbers and could further prescribe limitations on the armed contingents of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic and the creation of the necessary supervision.

At its 24 May 1958 session the Political Advisory Body called attention to the increasing danger created by the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. At the same session the member states of the Warsaw Pact justly noted that they had proven their readiness for disarmament with deeds; between 1955 and 1958 they had unilaterally carried out a reduction in force

of 2,477,000 and were further decreasing the size of their armies by 419,000. At the 5 February 1960 session held in Moscow the Political Advisory Body called on the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance to follow the example of the Warsaw Pact.

At the July 1966 session of the Political Advisory Body held in Bucharest the participants worked out a broad program embracing partial disarmament measures. They felt that great significance would attach to such measures as the liquidation of foreign military bases, the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories to behind their own national borders, a reduction of the armed forces of both German states to a definite degree in a definite time, the creation of atom-free zones, an obligation undertaken by powers with atomic weapons not to use atomic weapons against states in these zones, forbidding the maneuvering of aircraft with atomic and hydrogen weapons over European states, forbidding the visits of atomic submarines in the vicinity of Europe, rejecting the demand of the German Federal Republic for atomic weapons and preventing it from gaining access to atomic weapons in any form, directly or indirectly, via a grouping of states or separately therefrom.

The statement adopted at Bucharest pointed out: "It would have a very positive effect to convene a general European conference which would debate the questions of guaranteeing European security and developing universal European cooperation. The agreement born at such a conference might lead, for example, to a joint European declaration which would speak of the cooperation to be developed in the interest of maintaining and strengthening European security. In such a declaration the signatory states might assume the obligation to keep the interests of peace in view in their relations with one another, to resolve disputed questions only by peaceful means, to consult with and inform one another about questions of mutual interest and to aid the multilateral development of economic, scientific-technical and cultural contacts. Every interested state might join this declaration."

On this basis, at the 1969 Budapest session of the Political Advisory Body, the participants at the conference adopted the Budapest Appeal, which was the starting point for the concrete preparations for the 1975 European security and cooperation conference in Helsinki. We quote from this appeal: "Nearly 3 years ago in Bucharest the member states of the Warsaw Pact made a proposal for the convening of an all-European conference to debate the questions of European security and peaceful cooperation. The personal meetings which have taken place since show that not one European government raises its voice against the idea of an all-European conference and that there are realistic possibilities for holding it.

"Since World War II the European states have not even once come together to examine at the conference table the whole range of all these questions. If we start from the interests of consolidating peace there can be no weighty reason for postponing the convening of an all-European conference. Such a conference would correspond to the interests of all European states.

It would provide an opportunity to find jointly those ways and means which might lead to the liquidation of the division of Europe according to military groupings and to the peaceful cooperation of the European states and peoples."

At the sessions held in Warsaw in 1974, in Bucharest in 1976 and in Moscow in 1978 the Political Advisory Body repeated, supplemented and modernized its earlier initiatives and made new proposals. For example, the 1978 Moscow session proposed urgent measures to prevent the manufacture and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, submarines equipped with ballistic weapons, cruise missiles and neutron weapons. At the same session it was proposed that the five nuclear powers conduct discussions for the purpose of eliminating from the armory of the states all forms of nuclear weapons and of using nuclear power only for peaceful purposes. They considered it important to reduce by a definite percentage or by a certain magnitude the military budgets of countries with the most significant military and economic potential and to turn a part of the sums deriving from this reduction to economic aid for the poorest countries. This would serve simultaneously to reduce military confrontations and to liquidate the hunger and backwardness and the serious inheritance of colonialism.

At several sessions the Political Advisory Body proposed the signing of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the signing of a treaty which would oblige the parties not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons. The Political Advisory Body evidenced its readiness to disband the Warsaw Pact if the NATO countries would do the same and disband the North Atlantic Alliance. It also emphasized that the countries belonging to the organization of the Warsaw Pact were ready, as a first step, for the simultaneous dissolution of military organizations. They also proposed that both military-political alliances undertake not to increase the number of their members.

The Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Pact was formed in 1976. Thus far it has held only a few sessions but at these also there were important proposals for the consolidation of peace and security. At the session held in Budapest in May 1979 the Foreign Ministers' Committee proposed the convening of a conference of the signatories of the Helsinki Closing Document with representatives of 35 states to debate confidence building measures and steps serving to reduce armed forces and weapons. Some of the neutral countries gave a positive answer but even though the importance of the proposal was obvious the NATO countries sought ways out. The session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee held in Berlin on 5 and 6 December 1979 supplemented the May proposal with elements which had been raised by the Western partners. A new aspect of the proposal was that the conference might be substantively expanded, might deal with timely questions of military detente and disarmament, might take place in several stages and that the Madrid conference might have a role in the entire process.

At every session the Foreign Ministers' Committee devotes great attention to the Madrid conference planned for this November to discuss questions of European security and cooperation.

Unfortunately the rejection without any basic examination of the proposals of the Warsaw Pact has become virtually a routine function of the leading organs of the North Atlantic Alliance. There has hardly been an example of a constructive NATO response to the positive proposals of the Warsaw Pact. And there has not been one NATO proposal which would really have served the cause of peace and security. It is true that in 1968 the NATO countries brought up the idea of a reduction of forces in central Europe and later put this in the form of proposals. It is obvious, however, that the socialist countries--as we have noted above--took a stand beginning in the mid-1950's for the creation of a zone in Europe in which arms would be limited. So this NATO proposal was not new and the socialist countries had brought it up a good bit earlier--if not in this form. The events of the period which has transpired since the beginning of the Vienna talks prove in any case that the NATO states--despite their expressed intent--are in essence not ready for a reduction of forces in central Europe; thus far their negotiating tactics have been directed toward gaining unilateral military advantages in central Europe.

### III.

Profound changes took place in international relations at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's. The countries of the socialist community had then strengthened considerably and a number of developing states had taken the path of progress; the influence of the communist and labor movement and of the national liberation movements increased. In the area of strategic weapons a balance came into being between the Soviet Union and the United States and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The aggression against Vietnam dealt a serious blow to the international prestige of the United States and increased the internal contradictions of its system.

The unity of the NATO countries, which had come into being on cold war foundations, weakened; in 1967 France left the military organization of NATO. Later Greece also took a similar step. The governments of a number of capitalist countries rejected rigid confrontation and the policy of the cold war and took the path of a dialog with the socialist countries, of the search for rational and mutually profitable compromises. (From this viewpoint the social democrat and free democrat politicians of the FRG had a significant positive role in Western Europe. It was also of great importance that at the beginning of the 1970's a regime came to power in the United States which judged the situation more realistically than before and was able to draw appropriate conclusions from this.) The peoples of the NATO countries exercised ever more tangible pressure on their leaders and not rarely the interests of the leading circles of certain western European countries came into conflict with the interests of American monopoly capitalism.

Thus if finally became possible, on the basis of the changed international power relationships, to settle the so-called German question in Europe, for the well known treaties to come into being and for the quadrilateral agreement pertaining to West Berlin. And the fruit of the Warsaw Pact initiative,

and of the joint efforts of the socialist countries and of the bourgeois politicians who think soberly and take into consideration in a realistic way the mutual advantages of peace, ripened--the European security conference convened in Helsinki and on the first of August 1975 it was possible to sign the closing document thereof at the highest level. The achievements of detente and its possibilities for the future became palpable.

But after Helsinki there was a greater increase than before in the activity of those who had vainly tried to shelve this conference, whose calculations were not vindicated but rather frustrated by detente, who would like to return to the old methods, to some new form of the cold war. According to all the signs influential leading American groups have re-evaluated the political and military strategy of the United States and its relationship to detente. These circles have not learned from the lessons of history: they obviously believe that their aggressive action will be more effective than it was in the 1950's and that what did not succeed then will succeed--that essentially what happens in the world will be what the United States wants.

In what facts or steps does this re-evaluation appear?

--Since 1978 the intention behind their political decisions has been to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. This purpose is served by the increase in military expenditures in the NATO countries, by the western European deployment of medium range American nuclear rockets and by those western proposals at the Vienna force reduction talks which want to exclude from the effect of the reduction the backbone of the European military power of NATO, the Bundeswehr. This explains the return to methods which have already failed and the continuing attempts to set up new American military bases and new military alliances and to station American military forces in middle eastern and some Asian areas.

--The creation of the so-called quick reaction force by America is more dangerous than any preceding American idea because the existence of such a military unit is a threat against any country which wants to consolidate its economic and political independence by anti-imperialist steps.

--The leading American circles want to get the European NATO countries to extend the sphere of influence of the North Atlantic bloc to areas outside of Europe also so that NATO should be a tool in the hands of American strategy which can be used throughout the world.

--The United States is doing everything to expand NATO with new member countries; naturally this also is directed against European stability and balance.

--Behind the curtain of the myth of the "Soviet threat" they are steadfastly trying to bring the middle eastern oil under American supervision. If this should succeed Washington could exercise greater political influence than before on the developed capitalist states forced to import oil and on every country dependent on middle eastern oil.

--We find all these goals in a suitable packaging; the most recent armaments wave is presented as some sort of "supplementary arming" the purpose of which is to meet the alleged advantage of the Soviet Union. Accusing the Warsaw Pact of aggressive intentions, they have unfolded a world-wide propaganda and political campaign. They have reacted with an entire series of extreme and comprehensive measures to the fact that the Soviet Union offered aid to the progressive Afghan regime, with a limited military contingent, against an outside attack.

While some of the governments of the NATO countries, according to the signs, are subordinating themselves to this aggressive strategy with misgivings, hesitantly and a good bit as a result of open American pressure, NATO, as an organization, continues to act in accordance with its original mission.

It was a tool of American strategy and, it appears, so it remains. Experience also shows that it is not the more sober but rather the extreme ideas which are generally realized in NATO. Of course this does not mean that the leading circles and governmental factors of every country included in NATO would like to reject a policy of peace and security and the achievements of detente. This is especially true of those countries in the European contingent which are most interested in East-West cooperation politically, economically and from every viewpoint. Peaceful coexistence and detente have deep roots in Europe and it is to be hoped that the icy storm coming from beyond the sea will not pluck them out.

#### IV.

Looking back over the road which has been taken, we can proudly say on the occasion of the 25th anniversary that the Warsaw Pact has fulfilled both its interdependent historical tasks. On the one hand it has defended the sovereignty and independence of the socialist countries in the alliance against the aggressive strategy of imperialism and has created a military force which is equal to the armed force of NATO and is capable of beating back every imperialist attack. Never again will imperialism be in the position to force its will on the socialist world. On the other hand, in the past two and a half decades, the Warsaw Pact has realized a political strategy the essence of which is the consistent implementation of peaceful coexistence. Detente could not have come into existence without this policy of initiative of the Warsaw Pact. The settlement of very many political, military and other questions would have been impossible if the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the organization itself had not carried out ceaseless and successful political activity.

It is our firm conviction that in the future also the Warsaw Pact will be capable of frustrating the notions of the aggressive imperialist circles. In the future also political activity will be an important task of the Warsaw Pact, working out proposals which will further the cause of peace and security. Comrade Janos Kadar spoke of this as follows at the 12th party congress: "The Hungarian People's Republic, together with its allies,

the Soviet Union and the other member states of the Warsaw Pact, believes in the political solution of disputed international questions and supports the proposals aimed at stopping the arms race, the idea that equal security should be realized at a lower level of armament. We are ready to take any step which approaches the great goal of general disarmament. The organization of the Warsaw Pact--within the framework of which the Hungarian People's Republic faithfully fulfills its obligations--has carried out its defensive tasks with honor for 25 years. The organization of the Warsaw Pact does not strive for military superiority, does not desire to force its will on any other and it--justly--expects such behavior from the opposing forces also."

In the time ahead the countries of the Warsaw Pact place great emphasis on the solution of a few especially important problems.

--It would be a great service to the cause of peace if the peoples of Europe, uniting with all peace loving forces, were to prevent the realization of the NATO plan to deploy almost 600 medium range nuclear rockets in western Europe.

It is not too late! NATO could still rescind its decision or could suspend its execution. If it proceeded in this way the conditions would be again created for the initiation of talks between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO states about this very important question. The basis in the event of such talks could be the principle of equal security. President Carter himself and other high ranking American officials have admitted that there is a relative military balance in Europe. The NATO countries are now talking about inequality nevertheless. They are trying to remove from among the questions to be discussed such factors of the military balance as the American submarines carrying nuclear rockets, airplanes carrying atomic weapons, the atomic strike force of two European capitalist countries, England and France, and American military bases. This is not a serious approach to the question. The medium range weapons can be talked about only if all medium range weapons figure among the themes.

--The countries of the Warsaw Pact attribute great significance to those proposals worked out in Budapest and Berlin pertaining to disarmament and military detente in Europe. They feel that it would be timely to conduct talks about these initiatives, to set the themes, place and time for talks.

--Preparation for the Madrid meeting prescribed for the fall of this year requires careful work. If every country starts from this position then more serious preparations must begin now. It is our opinion that this meeting can be successful if the NATO states dispense with the methods they used in Belgrade, if they do not try to use the talks as a forum for a political campaign against the socialist states. The success of the conference requires that every country evidence responsible and constructive behavior in the spirit of the closing document.

As can be seen, there are things to discuss between the socialist and the capitalist countries. It is obvious, however, that the extreme American

measures taken under the pretext of Afghanistan and the western propaganda campaigns inspired by official circles run counter to the interests of peace and security. It is now timely to warn also that it is easy to undermine the results achieved thus far with thoughtless measures, but it is very difficult to build up that which has been destroyed. The sober politicians of Western Europe know this just as well as we. They also must act and not stand aside while the cold war circles gnaw at the foundations of detente; still less should they offer help to these circles.

Nor should the lessons of history be forgotten. If the global strategy of American imperialism failed in the 1950's, on what basis do the formulators of the new American strategy think to realize their present ideas? What did not succeed then can succeed even less now. If they then did not succeed in stopping the spread of socialism and progress, what realistic foundation can there be for this now? If both the cold and "hot" war attempts failed then, why should they succeed now? The international power relationships have changed to the benefit of the forces of socialism, progress and peace. No one can reverse this. It is on just this basis that the 25 year old Warsaw Pact continues to stand guard in the sentry box of peace and security.

A worthy celebration of the quarter century anniversary provides a good occasion for the member states of the Warsaw Pact to renew their faith in the cause of peaceful coexistence, detente and the fruitful cooperation of states and peoples. No one was able to shake the tranquil self-confidence of the Warsaw Pact even in a more difficult situation. Now also it will have sufficient patience and persistence for that great work which is necessary to realize its constructive initiatives.

8984

C50: 2500

**BABIUCH EXTOLS SOVIET-POLISH 'FRATERNAL ALLIANCE'**

LD010737 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 80 p 4

[Article by Edward Babiuch, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers: "Indestructible Fraternity"]

[Text] On 21 April the Polish people celebrate the 35th anniversary of the friendship, cooperation and mutual aid treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union. The coincidence of this important jubilee with the 35th anniversary of the victory over Hitler's fascism and the 25th anniversary of the creation of the Warsaw Pact military-political alliance is a testimony to the profound interconnection between these events. The constructive historical role and present-day significance of the relations of fraternal friendship and all-round cooperation between our states and peoples are being revealed more and more fully. The behests of the great Lenin, who dreamed of the time when our peoples, freed from the fetters of the past, would march side by side along the same road toward a bright future, have been realized. The 110th anniversary of the great leader's birth is being celebrated throughout our country as a very great holiday.

The historic Polish-Soviet treaty signed at the concluding stage of the struggle against Hitlerism was of fundamental significance for shaping the principles and practice of relations between the regenerated Polish state and the land of the Soviets and thus also for the future of our motherland. It enshrined the turning point in Polish-Soviet relations which had evolved during World War II, defined the principles of the two states' combat collaboration in the struggle against their common enemy, attested to the general desire for the consolidation of peace and also expressed the desire for the all-round development of alliance, friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation.

Life and the entire experience of the past 35 years confirm the correctness of the principles and fundamental ideological and political conceptions which determined the treaty's origin and essence and also the program of activity stemming from it.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev expressed this very precisely and magnificently: "The fraternal alliance of our peoples did not happen of its own accord. It was

not a gift to us from history. It was born in the joint struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Poland for freedom and happiness. It is the fruit of many years of efforts by the communists of both countries. Our parties can with full justification take major credit for this great gain. We believe it is our duty to safeguard our close alliance by every means, to strengthen it and enrich it with new content. We are well aware that this is the desire of the Polish communists and the will of the Polish people."

Thanks to socialism and the indestructible friendship and collaboration with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries of our community, People's Poland has successfully resolved in a historically brief period the basic problems of its independent existence and development.

The unity and close collaboration of the PZPR and the CPSU has been and remains the motive force of the Polish-Soviet alliance and cooperation.

Particularly important significance for the intensification of Polish-Soviet friendship and cooperation and for coordinated activity in the international arena attaches to meetings between the leaders of our parties and peoples, Comrades Edward Gierek and Leonid Ilich Brezhnev. They constantly give renewed impetus to the activity of our parties, state organs and public and economic organizations and define the framework for equal cooperation for the immediate and distant future.

The Eighth PZPR Congress, which defined the avenues for socialist Poland's further development and the improvement of the people's well-being, indicated in its documents and decisions the fundamental significance of expanding and intensifying cooperation with the USSR in all spheres of life, including the economic, scientific and technical sphere. The constant growth of the two countries' production potential and their relations of good neighborliness are factors which create an opportunity for the speedy and all-round development of cooperation. In the past 35 years qualitative changes have taken place in this cooperation, and particularly dynamic growth in mutual relations came about in the seventies. It may boldly be said that in these years these relations reached a higher, qualitatively new level. The increase in the volume of reciprocal commodity turnover, which will be in excess of R6.5 billion this year, that is, will have almost trebled compared with 1970, is a general reflection of this process.

We are turning increasingly boldly and successfully--in accordance with the requirements of socialist economic integration--to new and higher forms of collaboration. The main avenues concern the intensification of the division of labor in the processing industry, above all on the basis of specialization and production sharing, and in the joint solution of the problems of satisfying basic requirements for fuel and raw material.

The desire to further strengthen economic ties between our two countries has been embodied in the elaboration of a long-term program for the development of specialization and production sharing between Poland and the USSR, which will soon be adopted.

Work on coordinating the national economic plans of Poland and the USSR for 1981 through 1985 is at the concluding stage. During this work the main avenues for cooperation for the next 5-year period and on some specific questions for a longer term have been agreed.

We are sure that the implementation of these measures will promote the consolidation of integration ties between Poland and the Soviet Union and at the same time the development of the socialist countries' multilateral cooperation within the framework of CEMA.

[LD010739] "Key significance for the vital interests of the Polish people and state attaches to friendship, alliance and cooperation with the USSR, which comprise a firm basis of independence, sovereignty, security and peace for Poland," Comrade Edward Gierek, first secretary of the central committee, said at the Eighth PZPR Congress.

The congress fully confirmed the general line by which our party has been guided for 35 years now and which guarantees the implementation of the vital interests of the people and Polish state. It also confirmed the class essence--resting on the principles of proletarian internationalism--of the foreign policy of our party and state whose cornerstone consists of fraternal alliance, indestructible friendship and all-round cooperation with the USSR and the consolidation of unity and collaboration with all the socialist community countries.

Against the background of the process of the strengthening of the forces of peace and socialism in the world today, against the background of the important successes achieved above all in recent years in the struggle to create in Europe and pre-conditions for security and cooperation, the role and significance of coordinated collaboration in the foreign policy sphere between Poland and the USSR and all the Warsaw Pact states stands out particularly clearly and distinctly.

The most ardent desire of the Polish people, grown wise with the harsh experience of the past war, is the strengthening of peace. That is why we follow with close attention the development of the international situation which has recently been characterized by a grave rise in tension. The aggravation of the situation is caused by the imperialist forces, which have steered a course toward the resurrection of the cold war, are attempting to sink the process of detente, undermine the atmosphere of trust and international cooperation and impose a new spiral of the arms race, particularly the nuclear missile arms race, and are seeking to attain unilateral military superiority. History knows many examples of attempts of this kind. It has always passed its own sentence on them as contradicting the peoples' vital interests.

We fully share the profound and principled assessment of the aggravation of the international situation and resolutely support the proposals regarding ways of resolving the urgent questions contained in Comrade L.I. Brezhnev's January interview with the PRAVDA correspondent and his 22 February speech to voters. The words of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and the USSR Supreme Soviet presidium chairman are pervaded with calm, optimism and a profound sense of responsibility for the destiny of peace.

Like the USSR and the other allied countries, Poland's position is that in the present international situation key significance for the intensification of the process of the relaxation of political tensions and the conservation of its material structures attaches to supplementing this process with military detente. Naturally, the attainment of these goals is not promoted by the NATO countries' decision to increase their military budgets and to produce new nuclear missile weapons and deploy them in Western Europe, nor is it promoted by the deferment of U.S. Congress's ratification of the Soviet-U.S. SALT II treaty.

Our countries' position on this issue is well known to world public opinion. You only have to point to the documents of the Warsaw Pact states' political consultative committee and to recall its proposals, including the initiative regarding the convening of a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe. Bearing in mind the importance of this proposal and the unusually urgent nature of the solution of the problem, from the platform of the Eighth Congress Comrade E. Gierek came out with the initiative for holding this conference in Poland's capital, Warsaw.

We are glad that this proposal met with full support from our allies and friends--the Soviet Union and the other socialist community states. Lively interest has been displayed in this initiative by public opinion and those politicians in the West who advocate the continuation of the detente process.

Important significance for rallying all progressive forces in the struggle for the relaxation of tension and disarmament will attach to the Paris meeting of European communists, which the PZPR and French Communist Party have proposed convening.

Socialist Poland, like the other community states, is in full solidarity with all forces of progress democracy and socialism and with the peoples struggling for freedom and the right to determine the paths of their development themselves. Hence our support for the nonaligned movement, the developing countries, and the national liberation movements.

The time which has elapsed since the signing of the first Soviet-Polish friendship, cooperation and mutual aid treaty confirms convincingly that friendship, fraternity and collaboration with the USSR are the main basis of our achievements, a reliable guarantee of the development of socialist Poland and the foundation for its security and the consolidation of its position in the world. The principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism on which our alliance is based determine its strength and indestructibility and give grounds for regarding the fraternal relations uniting Poland with the Soviet Union as international ties of a qualitatively new type.

Our truly fraternal socialist alliance is the living possession of millions. It is being constantly developed and enhanced by our parties, states and peoples. Its unswerving consolidation, like the strengthening of the unity of all socialist community states, is the determining direction of Poland's foreign policy and the goal toward which its citizens strive.

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### ROMANIAN, HUNGARIAN ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSES ROLE OF PARTY, STATE

Budapest TARSADALOMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYEK in Hungarian No 4, 1979 pp 127-131

[Article by Gyorgy Szoboszlai: "Romanian-Hungarian Roundtable Discussion in Bucharest"]

[Text] In accordance with an invitation by the Institute of Political Sciences of the Stefan Gheorghiu Political Academy, Romania was visited by a 4-member delegation from the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. The delegation was headed by Dr Peter Schmidt, section head of the Institute of Social Sciences. Its members included Dr Lajos Kolozsvari, a county executive secretary, Dr Tibor Madarasz, university associate professor, and Dr Gyorgy Szoboszlai, member of the Institute of Social Sciences. They participated in an academic conference, which had as its central theme the relationship between the party and the state. It also dealt with the practical experiences derived from the application of party directives upon local and regional administrative organs.

The discussion began at the Political Academy in Bucharest. The conference was presided over by Laszlo Lorincz from the Romanian side, who is the assistant director of the Institute of Political Sciences. The most significant topic of the 2-day long exchange of ideas was the question of party control over state organs. In addition to this, however, the role of the state administration in its guidance of society also received considerable attention. The deliberations took place in the spirit of healthy exchange of views, and in the midst of intense mutual interests. It became clear already during the debate's initial phase that problems and difficulties stemming from social development are rather similar. Yet, there were differences in assessing many of the questions, and ideological solutions were characterized by differences in the methods of approach.

Both groups agreed that the complexities of building socialism make it essential to strengthen the role of the party, and to increase the awareness in the construction of society. Strengthening the party's position of leadership is one of the objective needs. The Romanian colleagues expressed the view that asserting the party's leading role requires new forms and methods. They wish to step beyond the ideological thesis according to

which the party fulfills only a general role of guidance. The need for new forms means that "the party's position of leadership has to become an inner one," on the basis of which party and state activities merge. In Romania, this merging is not yet complete, but that is the goal of the future. The intertwining of the party's and the state's activities manifests itself primarily in the merging, and in the "cumulations" of certain functions. In the regional and local councils the following functions were merged: the first secretary of the party committee is at the same time the chairman of the people's councils; and the secretary for propaganda, social welfare and economic affairs also occupies the same position with the people's councils. The merging of party and the state organs in local and regional administration, therefore, is not complete. It has been realized only in certain areas. In other areas the party and state organs have preserved their independence. The reason or the political-ideological inducement for merging these offices was to lessen parallelisms manifested in the activities of party and state organs.

The drawing together of the activities of the party and the state manifests itself also in the fact that central party and state organs often bring joint decisions concerning some of the more important questions of social development. These are at once political and legal acts, which are equally obligatory for the party and the state organs.

The combining of party and state functions, therefore, limits markedly the independence of local and regional councils. At the same time, the executive functions are not merged with the party's administrative apparatus. In the Romanian political system, organs of double dependency represent a completely separate breed of institutions. These are guided jointly by the party's and the state's central organs, and are themselves two-faced institutions. Their decisions are equally mandatory for lower level party and state organs. (Such, for example, is the National Council of Science and Technology.) In addition to the elimination of parallelisms, the trend to merge party and state organs is justified also by the claim that thereby they can better enforce responsibility, and transactions can also be speeded up.

In strengthening the party's leadership position, the Romanians attributed considerable significance to ideological work, i.e. to education, to continued training, and to propaganda activities. In accordance with the decisions of the Central Committee, party training takes place in three-year cycles. Within this training, they stress three main areas: a/ fundamental problems of party and societal activities; b/ problems of scientific socialism and economic developments; c/ dialectical and historical materialism, and the scientific guidance system.

They demonstrated the extensive organizational system of education, culture and ideological training through reviewing the practices in a specific county (Ploesti). Party education is divided into four main areas: party training in the strictest sense, youth association training, labor union training, and training realized within the United Socialist Front.

The personal needs of political education are supplied by a network of county instructors composed of 500 individuals. Their work is guided by a group that functions beside the Central Committee. There also exists a so-called people's university system. To explain social and economic questions they established a 150 person "scientific-cultural" brigade. Several movements are also built into the ideological propaganda system. Among these the Romanians emphasized the popular-cultural mass movement known as "We Sing to You Romania," which was initiated by the party's first secretary. Ideological activities are given strong financial support. The budget for country-level instructions amounts to 400,000,000 leis.

Following lectures and reviews by the Romanian members of the conference, the Hungarian delegation posed questions. Peter Schmidt emphasized that the Romanian and the Hungarian political systems are made similar by the fact that both of them function with a one-party system. He was curious to know whether the Romanians are questioning the very principle of the separateness of state and non-state organs, or are they simply viewing the mergers as a methodological question. The Romanians responded by claiming that they do not view the relationship between power and administration as simply one between the state and the party. Power and party are not synonymous concepts. Party, society, and the representative organs are equally participants in power. They refused to accept the ideological thesis which absolutized the party vis-a-vis the state administration. But their goal is to exclude polycentrism from society, for in their view, this creates problems in leadership. Their attitude is that combining offices today is an approach that assures the unity of the will. As of now, they have eliminated parallelisms only up to a certain point. The basic dualism of state and party organs is still there. The combining of offices is only the start of a process which began in 1968 and expected to increase in the future, and in historical perspective will lead to the merging of society and power. Today, party and state organs are still separate. From the point of view of influence, they distinguish among three types of organs: 1) party organs; 2) state organs; and 3) mixed party and state organs.

The growth of the number of organs with mixed composition and functions will serve as foundation for the thesis that "in Communism the organs are merged and thus form the basis for self-administration." They also emphasized that the party will have to integrate itself increasingly into society and into society's institutional system. In one of the comments they expressed the view that the Romanian political system does not exclude the pluralization of interests. The intention of the party is to gain social consensus, for which they constantly have to follow transformation in the social structure.

They stressed the fact that the main function of socialist power is the retention of that power. It is in defense of this goal that the Romanian Communist Party follows the principle of merging offices. At the same time, however, it also keeps in mind the need to make state goals into the goals of mass movements. They demonstrated this process through a concrete example, i.e. through the transformation of the state organizational system in training

and education. By the end of 1979 they will have transformed this system. The Educational and Pedagogical Congress will become the chief organ of training and education. It will meet every 5 years. Next to the Congress, an Educational and Pedagogical Council will also be established, chaired by a party functionary. The operational activities of the Council will be carried out by the Executive Bureau, presided over by the Minister of Education. In their estimation, two principles manifest themselves in this organizational transformation. On the one hand, it represents the deepening socialist democracy; rejecting the thesis that a precondition of democracy is a thorough separation of state and party functions. The other fundamental principle consists of increasing effectiveness. Therein, the most important element is made up of the preparation of decision-making, in the course of which the individual organs have to consider various special interests. They emphasized two aspects of democracy: Its institutionalization and its subjective conditions. In the new organizational system of education, the ministry is subjected to the Congress and to the Educational and Pedagogical Council. It is up to the elected social organs to apply the diverse social values and needs, and to counteract bureaucratic functions. The nature of this activity depends on the preparation of the cadres. They are also trying to eliminate parallelisms between the central party organs and the state organs. Thus, for example, in educational matters the appropriate secretary of the Central Committee retains a direct contact with the minister; and therefore the educational apparatus of the Central Committee has been dissolved.

This merging of functions is applied also to the leadership of business enterprises. The leading organ is the Workers' Committee, which has an executive council, headed by the director, who at the same time, is also the company's party secretary.

But how does this accumulation of offices appear in the regulations concerning elections, and what happens when elections for a specific office are unsuccessful? In their response, they pointed out that nominations for the combined offices are made through the United Socialist Front, and more recently multiple nominations have also become possible. First secretaries are selected by party conferences before elections for state bodies. During the last elections it happened that some of the first secretaries were not elected for state offices. In such instances new first secretaries are elected within the party.

Concerning common party and state functions, and their legal characteristics, they revealed that these political-legal norms are prepared by party organs, and they are debated and approved in joint sessions with state organs. This process requires the application of specific rules, but the accepted normative functions do not constitute a special category. On the contrary, they become part of the hierarchy of legal sources formulated by state organs in accordance with the functions of these organs.

During the remaining part of the conference, the Hungarian delegation presented its own point of view, and informed the hosts about the actual

functioning of the Hungarian political system. Peter Schmidt related that the development of this political system takes place in three different directions: a) the strengthening of the quality and effectiveness of the interest-expression, i.e. the augmentation of the state's role in giving expression to interests of the society as a whole, which is the primary obligation of social mass movements; b) improving social control over state organs, which requires the increasing application of the Marxist principle which demands that the state should function only as a subject-institution of society; c) the redefining of the social control role of the state, and the progressive transformation of its institutional system and its organizational framework. Practical life produces ever newer problems which have to be answered. The most important question in this area is the state's guiding role in the economy, i.e. what should be the relationship between state administration and business enterprises.

State ownership does not prevent society from supervising the degree and method of state intervention. On the contrary, it makes such supervision possible. The state, however, can free itself to a certain degree from immediate conditioning by society. The recognition of commodity-conditions, and the functioning of the impact-mechanism of economic controls presumes a political guarantee for the independence of business enterprises, and a guarantee for autonomous decisions within these enterprises. The speaker specifically emphasized that--as demonstrated by recent experiences--the state uses the method of indirect interventions very effectively.

Gyorgy Szoboszlai spoke about the party's role in the continued development of socialist democracy. He stressed that in the course of the past 20 years the party--as the leading organ of society and as the depository of power--achieved success in the building of a socialist society, not independently, but in close cooperation with society. The important functions of the party include the revelation of the values and interests manifested in the various alternatives in the course of social evolution, as well as the political analysis and evaluation of their content and interconnections. The party is in possession of knowledge applicable to specific courses of action. The exposition and analysis of interests is a complex political task and process. At the same time the party cannot assume responsibility for all of the conflicts of social evolution, even though these are produced unavoidably. In the exposition of interests, the representative organs of the state, at the social and mass organizations, and professional organizations all have a very significant role. Stemming from society's current level of development and structure, from the layout of the divisions of labor, and from other circumstances, non-antagonistic conflicts of interest do arise naturally. The momentary interests of individual strata, groups, and communities may in fact diverge from one another. And these can only be solved satisfactorily through a democratic process of compromise. The critical point of harmonization of interests is the definition and recognition of interests. Diverging interests can become part of the process of open administrative politics only if there exists a mechanism which is able to express the needs hidden behind the interests, and does so in light of

the inner requirements of a given political system. The political handling of interests may also be done without the above, but the processes directed toward this goal are difficult to survey, often accidental, and their proper social and political supervision can produce many difficulties. An informal harmonization of interests can be distorted by various subjective points of view. Its tendency to take various interests into account can become the source of instability and of many accidental factors in the political process. The role of the party chief in this process is of a determining nature; not by trying to reflect society's complex system of values, but by guiding and supervising the mechanism of interest-expression and interest-harmonization. A Marxist-Leninist party decides on what relations to bring into the sphere of immediate interest-harmonization based on existing political conditions. Moreover, it brings decisions concerning basic questions of social development to the collective forums of party democracy. Thus, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party follows the proven political line that preserves the unique role of the individual state and social organs in the political process. In accordance with this line, it aims at the separation of party and state functions insofar as possible, and in general at the separation of the state and the party. One of the administrative manifestations of this line is that decisions by party organs are not directly obligatory for the state organs. It is the party members who win acceptance for them. This separation cannot be absolutized, for not even our own political system is immune to common actions and attitudes by party and state organs.

During the debate it became clear that the differences between the Romanian and the Hungarian political systems can be traced back to a large degree to the divergent institutionalization of the economy, and to the ideological and practical differences in the guidance of this economy. The direct guidance of the economy according to a centralized plan requires the application of more immediate methods also in political leadership. Both groups agreed that, notwithstanding the differences in the political systems, the examination of socialist democracy revealed many common elements. They stressed the significance of the continued development of socialist democracy. This, however, is not a goal in itself only an instrument and a precondition in the further development of society. One of the key questions in the development of socialist society concerns the instruments and methods needed by society in the increasingly immediate running of its own affairs, and thus to assume the functions of the state. In short: How extensive is the self-realization of society. Solutions cannot be simplistic. Several divergent concrete solutions can serve the same system of goals.

Following the debate, the Romanian hosts provided information about the functions of the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy. This institution is the central political educational organ of the Romanian Communist Party that is responsible for a wide variety of educational activities. One of its important functions is to educate and to supply cadres for the leading party and state organs. But they are also training and retraining economic leaders, diplomats, foreign trade experts, university instructors, and journalists.

Thus, the Academy is a university-level institution that fulfills three roles: training, retraining, and scholarly research. The study plan of the Academy is prepared on the basis of the needs and directives of the Central Committee. Next to this central party school, party schools are also functioning in the megye administrative centers, and they assume a portion of the task of retraining.

At its closing session, the Hungarian-Romanian Conference was judged to have been useful by both participating groups. There was a mutual conviction that we can learn from each other's success and experiences, and that it would be possible to initiate a useful exchange of ideas so as to clarify further the differences of opinions.

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C50: 2500

## BRIEFS

SOVIET JOURNALIST'S VISIT--Yakov Alekseyevich Lomko, first deputy chairman of the USSR journalists association, is visiting the GDR for an exchange of experience with the GDR journalists association. He also visited the Werner Lambers International Journalism Institute and School of Solidarity during his stay. Y.A. Lomko was received for talks by Heinz Geggel, member of the SED Central Committee and head of the agitation department. The talks were attended by Harri Czepuck, chairman of the GDR journalists association. [Text] [AU170840 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 15 Apr 80 p 2]

GDR-POLISH EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION--Prof Hans-Joachim Boehme, GDR minister for university and technical school affairs, and Prof Dr Janusz Gorski, minister for science, higher education and technology of the Polish People's Republic, discussed questions of the continued intensification of university cooperation and scientific cooperation on Thursday [10 Apr] in Berlin. Minister Boehme informed the Polish guest about the preparatory work for the fifth university conference in the GDR. [AU141239 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 11 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

SOVIET SCHOOL IN GDR --Ten different specialist skills can be acquired at the Ensigns' School of the Soviet Armed Forces in [East] Germany, which has been operating there for 8 years. The specialties include that of a platoon leader, staff sergeant, weapons specialist and workshop, kitchen and camp leader. The modern training complex with its 32 special rooms offers good opportunities for the trainees to acquire the knowledge and skills of an ensign. Rooms for technical motor vehicle equipment and for riflemen's and tank weapons also are part of the complex. [AU171208 East Berlin NATIONAL-ZEITUNG in German 16 Apr 80 p 6]

PARTY PRESS IN CSSR--On 31 March Jindrich Skubal, deputy mayor of Prague, received in the Prague Old City Hall a delegation of editors-in-chief of the party papers of the socialist capital cities. The editors-in-chief are in Prague at the invitation of the daily VECERNI PRAHA, the organ of the Prague CPCZ City Committee. [AU031210 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 1 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

CSO: 2300

## PREMIER STROUGAL COMMENTS ON NEW ECONOMIC MEASURES

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Mar 80 pp 3-4

[Speech by Comrade Lubomir Strougal at statewide aktiv on improvement of system of planned management: "For Further Successful Development of Czechoslovak Economy"]

[Text] Management of the national economy represents one of the key areas of our party policy. Marx wrote that it was an irreplaceable element of every mode of production. If it is true generally, it applies all the more to socialism because the social ownership of the means of production makes it possible for the first time in the history of mankind to rationally control the economic potential of the entire society, to develop and multiply its wealth according to plan. Planning, programming and the tenacity of purpose are the most important prerequisites for accomplishing the ultimate goal--the building of the communist society.

Everybody knows also that the objective potential and advantages of socialism over capitalism cannot assert themselves automatically. Here again there must be planned and purposeful management, and unification of efforts of all members and units of the socialist society.

We could hardly find a person in our country who would not acknowledge or who would deny these basic truths. And yet practical experience convinces us that sometimes there is a large gap between such recognition of the utmost importance of management and its relevant implementation in action. After all, we know ourselves that there is not only much room for improvement in the application of new knowledge offered to management and organization by science, but that we also sometimes disregard the elementary requirements of organization and management of the economy.

All the more urgently and consistently must we strive for further progress in this area. An important step in this direction is the proposed changes in the system of planned management of the national economy which were approved by the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee and federal government.

## **Essence of Changes**

The first and, in our opinion, most important question which is related to the translation of the Set of Measures into everyday practice is the comprehension of the essence of these changes, including their casual contexts. The point is to realize that the steps which we are now taking in management of the national economy have both their historical background and a direct link to the present state of our economy. Most important of all, they should play an active role in the accomplishment of social-economic tasks which we face in the 1980's.

It is clear that the need for these changes is more than evident, primarily because essentially the present system--naturally with some exceptions--reflects the conditions extant in our economy in the 1950's. But we also know that the necessity to change the system became obvious as early as the end of the 1950's. For reasons which are well known--principally due to the unrealistic nature of the proposed solution of material problems--in the end no meaningful changes were carried out.

The party returned to these questions again in the mid-1960's. It is still in our vivid memory how this effort was deformed and abused against the socialist principles of management of the national economy as well as against those of the party itself. The representatives of revisionism succeeded in infiltrating the prepared proposals with principles and systems which were aimed at allowing, among other things, an absolutely free rein to market forces. These principles, alien to socialism, permeated all parts of the final project of management changes, thereby rendering it unacceptable in its entirety. To make matters worse, the economic equilibrium was virtually disrupted and the foundations of the socialist economy were undermined.

Upon the installation of the new party leadership, it was therefore imperative to pay attention to the practical, most urgent tasks: to restore the role of the plan, to restore democratic centralism in management, to restore balance between the central planning and the *khozraschet* principles, and to promote workers' active participation in management. The restoration of all these principles of the socialist economy was one of the prerequisites of the consolidation process, an integral part of it. The application of planned management of the economy on the basis of democratic centralism became one of the basic tools which made it possible to successfully implement the very demanding social-economic program formulated by the 14th CPCZ Congress. We stated this at the 15th CPCZ Congress.

We naturally realized that by so doing we did not dispose of the need for changes in the system of management and economic mechanism. We knew that mere restoration of the principles of the socialist planned management, despite many minor improvements, did not effectively help or solve--and in view of the existing situation it was hardly possible--the main thing that the 14th CPCZ Congress strove for, namely to consistently combine the

economic and social development with the systematic increase in efficiency of social production, with the more effective application of intensive factors in the economic growth.

Being aware of this, the 15th CPCZ Congress reemphasized the necessity of carrying out the necessary changes in the system and mechanism of management. They had to be changes which would not just bring about partial improvement of this or that aspect of management, but which would represent a mutually interlinked set of measures covering the largest possible scope of contexts in the consolidation of the basic principles of management of the socialist economy. This was to be achieved by increased production and consumption, more efficient application of scientific-technological progress, an unfolding process of socialist economic integration and under completely new conditions of, and impact by, the world economy.

The change in conditions and relationships between the factors in the economic development, however, is not the only cause. It is true that management must reflect the requirement of the specific historical stage in which our society finds itself but, it must also meet the requirement of the future development because only in this way can it perform its social function. And everybody will recognize that the demanding nature of the tasks which we will face in the 1980's is incomparably more complex than ever before, including the decade just passed.

It will be, I think, quite appropriate, if we bring to mind at least briefly all that has changed in our country in the 1970's, all that multiplies our forces and possibilities for the future, but that also in a certain sense raises new demands on management. Without exaggeration we can say that the 1970's represented a watershed in many respects and ushered in a qualitatively completely new stage of economic development, one which is fundamentally different from the preceding 25-year period.

#### Successful Decade

What changes did our economy undergo, what actually happened in the last decade? Let the facts speak for themselves:

--Our national income will amount to Kcs 474 billion this year and will be by 59 percent bigger than in 1970. Social labor productivity will have increased by 53 percent during this period.

--One trillion 338 billion Kcs were invested in the national economy during the last 10 years alone. The basic assets will reach the value of Kcs 2.5 trillion. The basic assets-worker ratio will increase by almost 60 percent and the machine-worker ratio alone by more than 75 percent during this period.

--The industrialization of our country made considerable progress. Industrial production will increase by 75 percent during this period with the

relatively more rapid increase in the development of progressive sectors and branches. The volume of engineering and chemical production will increase by 110 percent. The share of engineering products will reach 30.3 percent and of chemical products 8.6 percent of industrial production.

--At the same time, we started to carry out major structural changes during this period among which we regard as the most important the program of building nuclear power plants, including our participation in the manufacture of equipment for them. We made progress also in the manufacture of computers and mastered the manufacture of digitally controlled machine tools. We mastered various types of special production, program of pipe production and other prospective sectors. We further developed our petrochemical industry. During the last 9 years, the manufacture of plastics increased 3.5 times, that of synthetic fibers by 50 percent, while the manufacture of nitrogen fertilizers doubled. We created conditions for more effective utilization of wood substance and other domestic raw materials. One of the most important and most demanding national economic operations are the changes in the structure of the fuel-power basis. While domestic production accounted for less than 6 percent increase in energy sources in the Fifth Five-Year Plan, its share in the increase amounted to 20 percent during this five-year plan.

--Despite several years of unfavorable weather, agricultural production increased by 19 percent since 1970, including a 2 million ton or 27.4 percent increase in grain production, 540,000 ton or 39 percent increase in meat production, an 18 percent increase in milk production and a 21 percent increase in egg production. We achieved these results in agriculture with a further reduction of the labor force by 213,000, a 45 percent increase in labor productivity and a 22 percent increase in the yield per hectare of agricultural land. Of fundamental importance was the fact that the basic assets-worker ratio increased by 200 percent in agriculture, and the machine-worker ratio alone by almost 250 percent. Industrial fertilizers used per hectare of agricultural land amounted to 254 kg last year which was by 85 kg more than 10 years ago. In this way, we strengthened the industrial nature of agricultural production and increased the measure of self-sufficiency in food production at the same time.

--Efficiency of our building industry also increased not only in housing, but also industrial construction. In comparison with 1970, the construction volume will increase by 91.7 percent this year. The machine-worker ratio increased by almost 250 percent within the last decade. Our building industry successfully coped with the construction of large housing and industrial projects and transportation centers on the scale unprecedented in our country.

--During the period surveyed, we constantly increased the allocation of funds for advancement of science and technology. While we spent approximately Kcs 11 billion for this purpose in 1970, the corresponding amount will exceed Kcs 19 billion this year. We tripled the amount of funds earmarked for the purchase of licenses.

--We carried out major changes in employment both as to the branch and qualification structure. As I have already mentioned, the labor force in agriculture further declined in favor of industry, building and primarily of the tertiary sphere. In comparison with 34.1 percent in 1970, its share will increase to 37.7 percent this year. As to the qualification, the share of workers with highschool and college education increased from 21.6 percent to 26 percent.

--A further economic advancement of the Slovak Socialist Republic represents an important chapter in the overall results achieved in the development of our national economy during the 1970's. The trend toward the equalization of the economic level of both national republics continued in all areas of social life during this period.

#### Improvement of Living Standard Depends Upon Resources

As to the living standard, we achieved its biggest increase during the 1970's. The overall monetary incomes increased by more than 50 percent and exceeded Kcs 343 billion last year. Individual incomes derived from services and products offered free of charge increased in fact by 80 percent.

The structure of household incomes changed. While the households with the average income up to Kcs 9,600 per member accounted for 32 percent and those with the average income of Kcs 19,200 and over for 12 percent in 1970, the situation is reversed today. The first group accounts for only 12.7 percent and the second for 30 percent.

The total social consumption increased by full two-thirds in the last 9 years. This includes the funds spent on the assistance to families with children and to the newlyweds, on the increase in the retirement benefits, on schools, culture and health care.

Just for illustration: while incomes from social consumption amounted to Kcs 466 per 1,000 Kcs of earned incomes, this amount increased to Kcs 538 last year. This is a result which speaks for itself and which also predetermines much for the future.

Another important fact is that the incomes of cooperative farmers were brought to the level of workers in other sectors of the national economy. While the average remuneration of the cooperative farmer was less than 84 percent of the average wage in other sectors in 1970, it completely matched it already in 1978.

The scope of total individual consumption per capita increased by 31 percent since 1970. Important in this respect, however, is also its structure. This for example shows that meat consumption per capita increased by 12 kilograms--from 72 to 84 kg--and egg consumption by 13 percent in the last 9 years. Electric power and gas consumption in households per capita doubled. We had

18 cars per 100 households in 1970, there are 40 today. I could quote additional data on how the number of appliances in households and possibilities of spending leisure increased. For example, while 3.5 million of our citizens traveled abroad for vacation or brief excursions 10 years ago, their number exceeded 9 million already last year.

An important feature of the period surveyed--so far as the increase in the living standard is concerned--was and is an unprecedented scope and rate of housing construction. More than 1.25 million new apartments will have been completed in the last 10 years including this year which is almost 50 percent more than in the 1960's.

We spent by no means insignificant amounts on public projects carried out by our citizens within the so-called "Z" beautification campaign and the total value of this project will soon amount to at least Kcs 50 billion.

And what about our school system and its expansion, what about health care, what about other areas of the nonproduction sphere?

Additional new questions came to the fore in the last decade. I have in mind the improved protection of the living and working environment which constitutes an integral part of the living standard and socialist style of life and on which we likewise spent considerable amounts of money.

Closely related to these questions is also the fact that we began to cope successfully with such project as is the buildup and modernization of the capital of Prague, and above all with its housing and transportation problem, infrastructure and tertiary sphere. The demanding nature of this project is clear from the fact that we spent almost Kcs 140 billion for these purposes within the last 10 years, while the total input was only Kcs 47 billion during the 1961-1970 period. Moreover, we must not overlook that everything we did took place in the situation when the internal and particularly the external conditions became unusually complicated and aggravated.

We can therefore justly state that what we achieved in the development of our country, its material-technological basis, increase in the living standard, improvement of conditions for people living in our country, was unprecedented in our historical development. Naturally, this fact has also its other aspect--namely the high cost of maintaining the attained living standard. It should be clear to everybody that such a high rate of growth cannot be repeated in the 1980's and that in order to merely maintain the present high standard of living we shall have to substantially increase efficiency and productivity of our entire economy. Productivity will have to be much higher than the one we are attaining today. Awareness of this must be translated into all our activities and this is the purpose of the measures for the system of management approved by the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee and the federal government.

## Cooperation with the USSR

The results achieved in the development of the economy and living standard are directly and increasingly linked to the intensification of our participation in international division of labor, increase in our foreign trade. Its turnover increased by 171 percent since 1970, with the socialist countries accounting for the major part of this increase. The mutual commodity exchange with the CEMA countries increased 2.8 times, while with the Soviet Union it actually tripled.

Major structural changes took place in our foreign trade. Among them the most significant is the increase in the percentage of machinery imports. While these imports accounted for 33 percent for example in 1970, they reached already 38 percent in the Sixth 5-Year Plan. During this entire period, namely during the years 1971-1979, we imported Kcs 168 billion worth of machinery and equipment with which we strengthened our industrial equipment base. Just for the sake of comparison I would like to note that in the 1960's such purchases amounted to only Kcs 57 billion.

Another change lies in the increased percentage of imported energy and raw materials. We shall import almost twice as much crude oil and more than 700 percent more natural gas this year than in 1970.

As to the mutual cooperation with the CEMA member states, international division of labor was sharply intensified in the 1970's. After the adoption of the "Comprehensive Program of Socialist Economic Integration" and in connection with work on the long-term target programs, we signed several multilateral agreements on economic cooperation. We can welcome the fact that Czechoslovakia participates in the development of selected raw materials sectors in other CEMA member states, in the implementation of the program of manufacture of equipment for the nuclear power plants and growing production specialization and cooperation in various areas. By the beginning of this year our processing industries had signed about 100 multilateral and more than 200 bilateral contracts involving mainly engineering products.

Production specialization and cooperation agreed upon with the CEMA member states and mainly with the USSR will be of key importance also in the future. We have just signed with the Soviet Union a document of fundamental importance—a long-term program of production specialization and cooperation between the CSSR and the USSR valid up to 1990 which defines the goals, forms and basic tasks of cooperation in this area. At the recent 20th meeting of the Czechoslovak-Soviet commission for economic and scientific-technological cooperation, the representatives of ministries of both states signed, apart from several specialization agreements, seven subprograms in the area of heavy and transportation engineering, chemical and crude oil engineering, tractor and agricultural engineering, engineering for animal production and fodder production, electronics, chemical and petrochemical industries.

The signed documents create conditions for intensification of mutual economic relations in cooperating sectors, for increased efficiency and series production through the increase in mutual deliveries of special products. Many products require joint research and development of new and modernized machinery and equipment. We pay considerable attention to the introduction of progressive technological procedures, to the development and manufacture of highly-efficient technological equipment and to the consistent coordination of license policies. We should welcome also the plans for unification and standardization in mutually exchanged machinery and equipment because this creates prerequisites for further specialization and cooperation in the manufacture of subassemblies.

The adoption of the long-term program of production specialization and cooperation between the CSSR and the USSR will significantly affect not only the dynamics and structure of mutual economic relations, but also the long-term structural changes in the development of the Czechoslovak national economy after 1980. It is therefore imperative that maximum attention be paid by all levels of management--including the central agencies and all VHI [economic production units]--to individual problems and particularly to the rationalization and effectiveness of the submitted proposals.

I think that everything that has been said of the results achieved during the last decade offers sufficient evidence for us to realize again the strength of this economy and particularly the potential possessed by us in our future development.

Frankly, at the present time, when we are encountering many problems and difficulties, many people judge the situation only on the basis of existing problems and difficulties. Yet, every extreme has its consequences. In this case, a pessimistic view of the situation makes us lose perspective, the ability of realistically appraising the possibilities, finding a way out, and making a determined effort to solve them.

This is not to say that we can shut our eyes to the shortcomings and problems which exist in our economy. After all, at its last plenary session the CPCZ Central Committee again criticized this development.

#### Making Full Use of Intensive Factors

The utilization of intensive factors in the economic development is the only possible way for us to adopt in the coming period, and is in fact literally an absolute necessity. We do not want and cannot afford to stagnate in our development or even to live at the expense of future generations. In accordance with the available resources, we want to raise the living standard and continue in building a developed socialist society.

When we compare the trend in efficiency and general productivity of our economy with the strategic goals formulated by the 14th and 15th CPCZ congresses, and with the development in other industrially developed

countries in this respect, several weak points of the reproduction process come to the fore.

In the first place, we make ineffective use of primary resources which we put into our economy. The trend in comprehensive efficiency of social production, measured in terms of the relationship of the national income to the invested assets, has a declining tendency. This relationship reveals that we make ineffective use of raw materials energy, industrial materials, labor force as well as of the basic assets.

When we compare quite mechanically--disregarding the various and particularly structural differences--for example the energy consumption rate in our production with this in other industrial nations, we find that it is higher by a full 50 percent. We have a similar situation in regard to consumption of metals and other materials such as cement, timber and so on. It is quite obvious that this high consumption represents considerable potential for increasing production efficiency.

And how do we manage our manpower? An international comparison with similar industrialized nations reveals that the labor cost of social production in our country is very high. Other industrially developed countries have increased production in their processing industries with an ever decreasing labor force, while in our country the number of workers in these sectors has continued to increase.

The administration of basic assets has substantially deteriorated and become less efficient in recent years. The utilization of basic assets registered a full 9 percent decline during the 1971-1979 period.

With the share of investments in the consumed national income, we by no means lag behind other industrially developed countries because our 30 percent share is essentially identical with that of the FRG, France, Austria and other countries. What is not the same, however, is the structure of investments. Other industrially developed countries earmark a considerable share of them--approximately 60-80 percent--for modernization of basic assets. Although we can notice a small shift in work and deliveries to minor construction projects and machinery, their share earmarked for progressive modernization is approximately 40 percent only. The implications are obvious: in our country new jobs are constantly being created while the number of shifts worked continues to decline.

The low rate of utilization of basic assets results in only 50 percent actual utilization of production capacities. This is not to say that there are no bottlenecks in some production sectors. It is due to the way we invest. While we make unnecessary investments in some sectors, we do not develop those production programs which determine the proportionality of our national economy and which must contribute to the increase in efficiency.

## Impact of Changed External Conditions

The simultaneous occurrence of complex internal and external conditions especially in recent years was reflected also in the upset of the internal balance through frictions in supplier-customer relations and particularly in supply to the domestic market. You know that we have some problems in supply of industrial articles, but also in supply of meat and some food items. When we analyze the reasons, we always trace them ultimately to production, to the shortcomings in it. We are aware, moreover, that there are discrepancies between the ideas underlying this 5-year plan on the one hand and trend in the national income and individual incomes on the other.

This development urgently requires a gradually implemented but decisive solution. All the more so because everything that has happened in the world in the 1970's will obviously continue in the 1980's and will thus have a significant impact on our future development.

In this context it is proper to mention the nature of changes in external conditions. We must do so because these changes have been viewed so far in a simplified manner, confining the interpretations of them predominantly to the fact of the sharp increase in the prices of raw materials. The situation, however, is much more complex.

Certainly, the prices of crude oil and other raw materials did increase substantially, and it also became much more difficult to obtain them.

Due to the change in the relations between the prices of raw materials and finished products, the trade and payments balances in most countries were upset, inflationary tendencies strengthened, the scope of investments was reduced and economic growth slowed down. All this resulted in the mobilization of the export potential and a more vigorous competition.

A major new phenomenon also is the fact that, due to these fresh stimuli, scientific-technological progress has accelerated. This is reflected in relatively rapid technological changes, intensive modernization of production capacities, qualitative advance in the capacities of scientific-technological research and development, and its more rapid application.

The effect of the energy crisis also is profound. While the principal motivation of innovation activity prior to 1973 was the productivity increase through the reduction of labor force even at the price of larger material and energy inputs, the focus of innovation effort after 1973 increasingly shifted to the area of reductions in consumption of energy and raw materials.

Important changes occurred in the economic development of the Soviet Union and other CEMA countries in the course of the 1970's. They substantially increased their economic and scientific-technological potential, expanded

their trade and economic relations generally, not only among themselves but also with the countries outside the socialist community. Most of the socialist countries rapidly began to make use of the intensification factors in the economic growth.

Although these and other changes which take place in the socialist community are of different nature and are motivated by different socio-economic goals than in the capitalist countries, this does not alter the fact that the tendencies toward increasing demands on quality and technical standards of products are quite identical.

It is important for us to realize that all these tendencies and facts mentioned above will not only persist but may be even multiplied and complicated by new additional factors in the 1980's. There may be another round of uncontrollable increases in the prices of some raw materials, particularly metals, phosphates and proteins, and some explicitly discriminatory measures may also be applied against us. This will cause further complications which we will be able to overcome only through more rapid increases in the overall efficiency of our national economy and expansion of socialist economic integration.

Everything that I have said of the positive aspects and weak points of our economy, of the changes in the internal and especially external conditions in which it operates and of their potential effect in the 1980's--all that makes absolutely imperative the gradual, but fundamental changes in the overall management of our economy, including in the system and the economic mechanism. If, in addition, we take into account that these changes were needed even earlier, that the need for them existed prior to 1970, then the sum total of arguments and justifications for the adoption of such measures is absolutely convincing.

#### Tool for Accomplishment of Goals

In the preparation of this proposal we tried to employ the approach which was defined by Conrade Husak, secretary general of the CPCZ Central Committee, in the following way: "In improving the system of planned management during the Sixth 5-Year Plan, we shall preserve and further develop everything that was found good. At the same time, we shall verify and introduce new elements primarily in those instances, where the present tools proved inadequate in the implementation of our economic policy."

As is well-known, in recent years we began testing some new elements in the mechanism of management through the Experiment. The Experiment involves almost half a million workers and is therefore by no means small. Although we do not exaggerate the results achieved during this short period, it has been nevertheless confirmed that the verified changes lead also to changes in thinking, decision-making and, what we regard as the most important, they establish more demanding criteria of work and bring generally better results.

Nor should we overlook the fact that during the preparation of these proposals we had the opportunity of comparing them with those of other socialist countries, and particularly with the guidelines formulated for this area by the 25th CPSU Congress, and with the documents which the CPSU Central Committee and the council of ministers adopted in the middle of last year.

The question, naturally, may be posed whether the Set of Measures Designed To Improve the Planned Management System is by its nature of such type that it will radically change the existing situation. I say frankly that it will not. Its translation into the reality will not cure all ailments which plague our national economy.

We must always keep in mind that the Set of Measures constitutes a tool for achieving social-economic goals and as such will not work automatically, but only when it is implemented in specific management activity of people and institutions. The effectiveness of proposed changes in the system of management and economic mechanism will thus depend not on the changes made in the system, but on those who will apply them in practice, on those who will correctly and rapidly grasp their meaning and essence as well as the requirements of the times. Last but not least, their effectiveness will depend also on how well the management personnel of enterprises, VNI, PZO [foreign trade enterprises], central organs, ministries, but also those of party, trade union and youth organizations, can break the barrier of long-existing habits and well-trodden paths.

Let me give you one representative example. As far back as 2 years ago we decided that the gross production indicator should no longer be used as the sole criterion in the evaluation of the plan fulfillment by the experimenting--and some other--enterprises and plants. Nevertheless, this indicator is used as the most important not only by the economic management of plants and enterprises, but also by the communication media.

It is most urgent that we thoroughly explain the meaning and objectives of changes in management to all workers. It is the indispensable condition of their active participation in the application of approved measures in individual workplaces. Without these elucidations and without this support, the management staffs of enterprises and VNI could find themselves in a not-too-enviable position.

At the same time we must see to it that the new measures be incorporated into all the necessary methodical, organizational, management and legal documents, including the guidelines issued by individual ministries. Furthermore, and this is by no means less important, they must also be incorporated at the lower levels of management, including the enterprise and intra-enterprise sectors.

## More Effective Management

What do the adopted measures aim at, what is the nature of goals which we want to attain? In the first place, we are interested in making the system of management a more effective tool in the implementation of tasks of economic and social development, in its exercising more active effect on the application of the latest scientific and technological achievements, in stimulating our economy to the utilization of possibilities of socialist economic integration and international division of labor in general, and last but not least in its creating better conditions for creative activity of workers.

In other words, the system of management must set these key developmental factors into motion and thus help to gradually implement the strategic goal of the intensive-economic-production development.

We eliminate from or at least suppress in the mechanism of management those elements which encouraged the utilization of extensive factors in the economic growth. On the other hand, we reintroduce those tools which will exert much stronger economic pressure on management of enterprises and VNIJ.

The entire mechanism of the system of management, the concept of plan as well as the economic tools aim at the significant increase in efficiency of management of energy and raw materials resources, basic assets and human labor. These are far-reaching changes in the present-day practice.

I have already briefly outlined where and in what are the weak points of our economy. It must be emphasized again that the main causes of its overall low efficiency and productivity must be recognized to lie primarily in the subjective factor, that is, in the management as a whole. This means not only in the system itself, but also in the management operations of individuals, heads of their staffs, in the low level of analytical and decision-making functioning on their part, in their not always adequate qualifications and competence, and in some cases—unfortunately we must point this out—in their irresponsibility.

The situation is, of course, more complex. It is more complex because, as long as the general conditions of management allow such behavior, as long as we do not have the correct standard for measuring the results and, as long as we remunerate all in the same way, it is easy for people, including managers, to adapt themselves to these conditions. It is namely always the case that most people behave so-to-say normally, that is, in accordance with the given conditions. For this reason, if we want to change their behavior, activity, thinking and attitudes, we must change in the first place the conditions, the rules which fundamentally affect and determine people's behavior.

We think that the Set of Measures just adopted and its translation into everyday practices will contribute to a new approach, to the more rapid action on the solution of economic problems because it lays emphasis on the most important aspects of the system of management. The changes in planning depend to a large extent upon the changes in khozraschet management and application of principles of material incentives and vice versa.

We thereby strive for the more consistent implementation of the theses about the unity of the plan and khozraschet, about the greater dependence of funds that will be available to VNI and enterprises on the results actually achieved. In this way, the enterprise interests will be even more closely interlinked with the interests of the entire society and this will form a better basis for the development of initiative and socialist competition.

We must also anticipate, of course, that the introduction of the Measures will not be received by all with open arms, that they will not suit everybody. However, the interests of sound economic development require that the situation and problems be solved consistently from the standpoint and to the benefit of the society and not on the basis of compromises, concessions to backwardness and low efficiency simply because we want to please everybody.

With the Set of Measures we strengthen, in the first place, the role of the plan as the basic tool for achieving efficiency, proportionality and balance of the economic development. These natural requirements assume a new meaning at the present time which we must enforce both at the center and in the economic production units and enterprises. This must be emphasized because, while preserving democratic centralism in economic relations, the changes in the system are designed to give a substantially greater responsibility for planning and management to the lower-level production and trade units.

We regard it as imperative for the plan to be in the first place the tool for the application of scientific-technological progress in the national economy, to secure specific tasks in increasing the quality of products, reducing consumption of energy and material and effectively utilizing manpower and basic assets. Only in this way can the plan fulfill what we expect of it in the coming period.

For these reasons, we link the improvement of the plan to the change in the system of indicators by which we shall judge the activities and economic results of enterprises. Instead of gross production the basis will be value added which will make it possible to evaluate better the actual contribution of every production collective to the final national economic total. In considering the fulfillment of the plan by the enterprise, therefore, cooperation with other enterprises will not be included, nor the other material, sometimes fictitious, inputs which made various

machinations possible. Of great importance will be also other indicators, such as economic distribution of production, quality of products, returns on invested funds and others. From the set of indicators we shall design a mandatory system directly affecting the formulation of the incentive funds. The managers will have to learn quickly how to handle them properly.

I want to point out that this will not be an easy task because the gross production indicator put up with almost anything and could conceal many shortcomings. It was therefore compiled with without great difficulties. While virtually all economic units surveyed complied with it in 1979, compliance measured by the set of 7 indicators (introduced on 1 January 1979), which partly eliminates the negative aspects of the gross-production indicator and is more closely related to the national income was only achieved by little more than 50 percent of organizations.

The quality of the plan anticipates a consistent interlinking of needs and resources, outputs and results. A plan which is balanced only on paper cannot fulfill the organizing role which it must have in our society. For this reason great responsibility rests with the planning organs at all levels--at the center, in economic production units, enterprises, national committees and cooperatives--because it is not possible to put off the solution of a number of vital material-flow and price-cost decisions till the fulfillment-stage of the plan.

#### Five-Year-Plan--the Basic Plan

I would like to emphasize that the decentralization of planning and decision-making is an important part of the changes. It makes it possible for decision-making to take place at a level which possesses best prerequisites for it. Excessive centralization ties people's hands, prevents the application of naturally-occurring desirable economic criteria and prevents decisions from being timely.

We must bear in mind that the linkage between individual sectors and branches of our economy is already so interdependent today that any breakdown is reflected in the final productivity. It is therefore anticipated that we shall continue in the effort to improve the present system of balances from top to bottom, so that the plan is guaranteed in all its basic relationships. Moreover, we want the plan to be backed up by economic contracts even before it is approved. Everyone of us is a supplier and a customer at the same time, and must therefore behave in this double role accordingly.

The orientation to the long-term factors in growth makes it necessary to formulate the tasks for longer periods and not to limit them to 1-year periods. It remains, of course, necessary to operate and make decisions also for the January-December periods. But it must not be done the way it has been done so far--namely, that everything is tied to it. After all, this frequently results in outright squandering of funds and in waste,

just because allegedly all allocated funds must be spent by the end of the year, and a smooth transition from one year to another is an exception rather than the rule.

This is the reason why we are establishing with the help of the Set of Measures the most urgent principle that the basis of planning must henceforth be the 5-year plan--not only at the center, but also in the economic production units and enterprises. The tasks, limits and other economic terms specified by the 5-year plan will be the point of departure for drawing up the annual plans.

We make no attempt to conceal the fact that these questions, more than anything, cause us a great deal of concern. Many material aspects of the plan have not as yet been resolved. Moreover, many factors which may affect the development during the next 5-year plan, especially concerning external relationships, cannot be foreseen at all. For this reason, we do not want to approach the stability of the 5-year plan from the position of dogmatic inflexibility of tasks, but from the standpoint of a certain, even though conditioned, stability of operational management. And naturally also from the standpoint of rules under which we shall control the enterprise operations and their basic orientation. But we need clearcut rules under which to formulate the relations concerning the fulfillment of tasks and production of resources, between the annual and the 5-year plans. That we need more than anything else.

In addition, what we need is for the individual levels of management to learn how to plan and make decisions in terms of the 5-year plans in order to produce, distribute and use the resources most rationally in accordance with the requirement of societywide efficiency increase. And we must make it possible for a person who wants to produce a bigger genuine output to be able to do so and we must provide incentives for him to do so. At the same time, we deem it indispensable to create reserves at all levels of management and to administer them as a tool for overcoming partial disproportions and strengthening the long-term stability.

The effect of the adopted measures will depend to a considerable extent upon the correct functioning of the price system. We are about to make the unavoidable changes in the wholesale prices of fuels, energy and some raw materials in order to bring them closer to the prices at which we purchase them on the foreign markets. The transition to the world prices--although it will not be possible to do it all at once--is an economic and political necessity. That is the only way to create conditions, criteria and stimuli for the management to function at the level at which the best producers, both in the socialist countries and in the rest of the world, function. This operation will be all the more complex since the higher prices will have to be offset to a maximum possible degree, by the reduction of production cost in the processing sectors. This will, naturally, force the enterprises to find ways of more effective utilization of fuels, energy and raw and industrial materials.

## Due Appreciation of Scientific-Technological Progress

If we are to bring about a radical change in efficiency, we must optimally apply the latest scientific and technological achievements in production. This is the basic, I would say strategic, feature of the changes we are introducing. The purpose is not just to solve some minor technical problems but most importantly to raise the technical standard of our products, particularly in selected sectors of the material-technological basis of production. This is a new quality to which the changes in the system of management and demands on work of all components of the research-production-use cycle must conform. The world changes. Yesterday, decisive say belonged to those who enjoyed the monopoly of production in processing industries. The situation is different today: even vis-a-vis the monopolies and concerns which occupy key positions in a respective production, the decisive say belongs to those who possess intellectual wealth, who come up with new technical solutions and thus qualitatively improve upon the existing technical and economic standards of products. In other words, the monopoly of production has been transformed into the monopoly of science, technical development and progress.

What does it mean in practice? First of all, we must make use in production of everything that scientific-technological progress offers us. And this is by no means little. After all, our research and development solves almost 30,000 problems every year. Another large number of problems are solved by scientific-technical cooperation with the CEMA countries. We buy licenses. We register more than 7,000 inventions and approximately 300,000 innovation proposals every year.

Do we make adequate use of all these resources? We do not. Is it not true that in quite a few instances a great deal of time and energy is spent on proving that things cannot be done? According to all indications, we face a somewhat preposterous situation: instead of showing incessant and permanent interest in new things, instead of demonstrating--as they say--insatiable "hunger" for new technologies, production is saddled by a complex and yet ineffective mechanism through which we force the enterprises to go in order to apply the research achievements in production. Moreover, we very frequently find that the enterprises make the implementation dependent upon the allocation of additional investment and other funds. These funds, naturally, are not available at the center and so we are back to square one. The assigned supplemental funds are used for something completely different, as if science and technology were not part of our resources and occupied one of the last places in the line. As a result, a large number of enterprises have managed to have a good life without making innovations in their production for many years, but the society pays for it dearly.

For these reasons, we more consistently link the plan for advancement of science and technology to other sections of the plan and are introducing a set of indicators designed to promote technological progress. Today, the

world market appreciates not only the quality of products, but also the producers' ability to offer the largest possible assortment of types, best advice, service and other requisites.

We must more than ever before concentrate assets in the key areas of research, development and production, and particularly substantially expand our scientific and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

We definitely cannot continue to neglect those sectors on which the higher technical standard of other sectors and branches of the national economy depends. This includes primarily the material basis of electronics industry, automation, employment of robots and application of chemicals. The level of our creative and technical potential is adequate to deal with these problems. When we combine our forces with the scientific-technical potential of the USSR, we should make rapid progress.

While laying emphasis on the technically progressive production sectors, on the quality increase, we must not lose our lead in those products which are of high standard and are among our good export articles. The world still appreciates some of our machines for the textile industry, machines for hides' processing, trucks, certain types of machine tools, forming and stamping machines, printing presses and other engineering and other products. They must be systematically improved by application of achievements from other scientific disciplines. Only in this way shall we maintain permanently our primacy or prominent place in competition.

Wherever it is expedient and necessary, we shall make available capacities for these products in those enterprises whose present production is questionable. After all, it is impossible to enlarge capacities for top quality products through new capital investment alone. This process is unbearably long apart from the fact that we thereby cannot take care of a number of related problems: labor force, discontinuation of unnecessary or unprofitable production, and so on. Naturally, we cannot leave the decisions on these questions to VHI alone, although they must play a more active role than they did so far. In order to attain this goal, we assume in the Set of Measures that we shall determine directly in the plan the mandatory share of first-quality products and technically progressive products in the total production volume. This will be simultaneously also one of the criteria which will affect the production of funds earmarked for material incentives.

We must pay much greater attention to the research and development base. There are quite a few things with which we are not satisfied and which must be corrected. We must assign to research clear-cut and more demanding tasks which will promote and increase production efficiency. We cannot just passively watch while some research institutes and centers deal with various problems which are of practical significance to production. This is

true, even though 90 percent of the research institutes in industry are directly subordinated to the economic production units.

Naturally, research centers alone are not always to blame. If production is not interested in their achievements, then research workers investigate problems which satisfy them from scientific or other viewpoints.

Correction must therefore begin with the plan itself which we must make to reflect production needs, to cover the entire cycle from the development of new equipment to its final use and interlink technological progress with capital investment.

For all these reasons, it seems imperative to reappraise the present approach to research and development. We must take as the point of departure that, as it is a factor of strategic importance, it must be properly expanded, organized and managed. The economic development in the 1980's makes it absolutely indispensable. In the first place, research facilities must be more concentrated. At the present time, the research and development potential, incorporated directly in the enterprise sphere, is dispersed into almost 1,400 centers, with some of them having only a few dozen workers and therefore unable to discharge their function properly. We must put an end to the linear allocation of funds.

Our own research and development potential must be multiplied by wider application of foreign scientific and technological achievements. This will, of course, require developing an ambitious program of basic research projects on the contractual basis and within production cooperation with the industrially developed countries, and particularly within the framework of the socialist economic integration. In addition, we need a more flexible, though prudent license policy. From what I have briefly outlined it is clear that a great deal of work in this area is yet to be done.

#### VHJ Responsibility

As I have already pointed out, the effect of external changes on our national economy has been much greater than we had anticipated when drawing the Sixth 5-Year Plan. On the other hand, response and adaptation of our economy to these conditions has been less prompt and less vigorous than the situation has required. The solution of the problem does not lie in slowing down the dynamics of foreign trade.

Above everything else, we must maximally promote export competitiveness and increase the efficiency of foreign trade operations. What we need more than anything else is for the production sector to make the most effective use of imported raw materials, and for our export products to bring in substantially higher prices. This is the only sound and inevitable way how to react to the present price trend in the world. We want to implement this intention by a set of measures which, however, will have yet to be worked out in more detail.

A very important feature which permeates the entire Set of Measures is the strengthening of direct ties between the plan and khozraschet. The emphasis on the set of qualitative indicators creates a new basis for production of resources and distribution of funds designed to increase khozraschet responsibility, and renders the tools of material incentives more effective. We shall generally apply the principle that the production of financial and incentive funds and their distribution will completely depend not only upon the production of planned profit, but also on the compliance with specifically listed qualitative criteria.

This significantly increases the responsibility of the economic production units for economic results. We must see to it that the mechanism of the system of management within the VHJ should result in a systematic increase in the production efficiency, interlinking of management of individual plants and enterprises, production research, sales and other units.

This means that we shall have to pay--in accordance with the resolutions of the 15th CPCZ Congress--increased attention to the organization, of the VHJ, their internal operation and to relations among individual enterprises and plants. We must strive much more vigorously to make VHJ really the basic unit of management in the khozraschet sphere, to make them responsible for the development of sectors entrusted to them, for the smooth flow of supplies to the national economy, implementation of uniform technical and investment policy, and for the development of effective methods of management and organization. This has not been the case so far.

All this, of course, cannot be done at once, but must be achieved gradually. Our idea is that within the next 2 years the programs should be worked out for the development of management of individual ministries, VHJ and enterprises which occupy the pivotal place in the solution of these problems.

In comparison with the present situation, we shall also strengthen the role of khozraschet in the area of investments. They will be financed mainly out of enterprises' and VHJ's own financial funds and by bank credit. Subsidies from the state budget will be advanced on an exceptional basis only. This is the decisive fact also for distribution of profits which means that the percentage of obligatory levies to the state budget will be reduced.

According to the tentative estimates, the ratio of profit earmarked for financing of needs will be approximately 30-37 percent in contrast to the present 22-28 percent. This represents a substantial increase. Future experience will show whether it will be expedient to further increase this share as has already been done for example in the USSR and other socialist countries. These measures on the one hand strengthen control of the center over the formulation of long-term investment policy and on the other hand substantially increase the responsibility of enterprises and VHJ for its efficient implementation.

The purpose of these and other measures is to focus attention of VHJ and enterprises to the optimal utilization of existing basic assets, and to

permit them to make new investments only after all available facilities have been exhausted. The indicators of productivity of production assets, utilization of basic assets and work shifts will be of decisive importance. In other words, this means that productivity of investments will be judged in conjunction with the productivity of the entire area of the basic assets management.

The present practice, when capital investments were made more or less independently of the overall administration of basic assets, put excessive pressure for new investments, while the existing basic assets continued to be utilized less and less effectively. This is also the reason why it takes so long in many production facilities to get a return on their investment. This happens practically without affecting in any way the indicators of management, without any consequences for the management and collectives of the VHI involved. And then it is all of us who feel the impact of this situation. Indeed, management cannot operate in this anonymous manner.

#### Demanding Conditions for Everybody

The application of the new rules of management in the VHI and enterprises will be very demanding and often unpleasant. We say frankly, however, that these measures are unavoidable. We create thereby demanding conditions for all, and it will depend primarily on the abilities of the management and the collectives how they cope with them. According to the results of their own work, they will be creating resources for their development and, in a broader sense also for the development of living conditions of workers. The principles of differentiation and individual merit must help us promote the intensive production development within the shortest period of time and as efficiently as possible.

For this reason, the Set of Measures calculates on changes in the system of material incentives for individuals as well as collectives. We want for the remuneration to equal the value which was produced by the work for society. After all, people and collectives do not work in the same way, and it is therefore correct that somebody who achieves better results should earn more than the person whose performance is inferior.

The present situation in the relationship between labor productivity and wages does not conform to these our concepts. Labor productivity increased almost twice as fast as average wages during the Fifth 5-Year Plan. We had anticipated a similar development in the Sixth 5-Year Plan, but in reality wages accounted for almost 80 percent of the labor productivity increase. For this reason, the share of wages in the total production value is being reduced more slowly than anticipated by the plan.

The differences between individual enterprises in the level and dynamics of production of wage funds are not commensurate to the differences in the

work and economic results from the standpoint of quantity, and particularly quality and technical standard. Moreover, less than 4 percent of wage funds are linked to the key goals of efficiency, quality and export competitiveness.

The adopted measures anticipate that the receipts, commodity production and so on will no longer be decisive for determining the amount of wage funds. All of us know that these indicators frequently resulted in giving preference to production involving bigger material consumption, and encouraged useless cooperation. The basic component of wage funds will depend on the actual performance which does not include material costs. This will secure a better balance between the trend in wages and that in national income. The material interest in the increase in overall efficiency will be stimulated also by the indicator of productivity of basic assets which is the criterion for the generating of the material incentive component of the wage funds.

Stricter criteria are thus being established for production of wage funds, the incentive effect is strengthened and conditions are created for a more pronounced differentiation of earnings according to the results achieved.

Greater emphasis will be laid on balancing the plan targets and their detailing, on the quality of the price system and particularly on prudent and responsible management of wage funds.

In order to encourage the material interest in flexible and systematic uncovering of reserves, we shall--in accordance with the principle of long-term nature of tasks and criteria of the plan--determine the relationship between the wage funds and achieved results for the entire 5-year period.

Much effort has been spent on making the system of remuneration more effective, on making it better reflect the socialist principle of remuneration according to work performed. The results in this respect, however, are far from meeting our present needs. While the tendencies toward wage equalization persist on the one hand, there are instances of excessively big differences in earnings on the other. There is no courage to change the established relations and to put in practice bigger difference in wages, justified by the performance and quality of work. We have still not succeeded in overcoming the average neutrality and the inclination to mediocrity.

Even the criteria for appraising the work results are not reliable and often are not established at all. The standards for measuring time needed to do a certain job are used for less than 40 percent of workers in industry; moreover, a considerable percentage of these standards no longer corresponds to the present technical-organizational level and conceals reserves, which sometimes are very big. The low quality of standards

for measuring labor consumption encourages the so-called "wage ceiling" with the result that the standards of output are deliberately met only to a certain limited extent. Moreover, we still lack a system of systematic evaluation of workload for large groups of blue-collar workers, particularly in auxiliary and maintenance sectors, and virtually for the entire technical and economic personnel.

A big weakness is also the absence of criteria for introduction of effective forms of material incentives based on the quality of products, rational utilization of raw and industrial materials, energy, motor fuels, production facilities and so on. For example, many engineering, chemical, lumber and building enterprises use incentives based on savings of material for only about 20 percent of workers, and those based on the quality of products' for less than 50 percent of workers.

It will be necessary also to revise virtually all premium award systems now in effect and the rules for granting bonuses. On the basis of better, more accurate standards, they will reflect the new indicators derived from the state plan tasks so that they will correspond to the work content and responsibility of individual workers, and harmonize production of resources and workers' claims. We must put an end to the present state of affairs when, contrary to the plan, "softer" indicators are used for the collectives and individuals--indicators which are too general and nonspecific and with which workers often are not even acquainted and therefore cannot influence them.

Greater courage must be shown in the evaluation and remuneration of workers achieving outstanding results whose work is of extraordinary importance to society. This category primarily includes creative workers and executors of scientific-technological progress. It is imperative to apply the principle of individual merits also to them and to combine it with a high degree of moral appreciation.

In all groups of workers, we shall not only vigorously stimulate efficiency and economic contribution but also consistently invoke accountability for the results achieved.

It is necessary to say frankly that in case of some workers we shall insist that they back their present earning level by a considerably greater work effort. Those of them who will permanently fail to cope with their tasks must expect to have this reflected in their wages.

It is necessary to see that the consistent application of these principles in remuneration will pave the way to the differentiation process, will be very demanding and give rise to conflicts in the entire economic sphere. It is imperative to proceed with compassion but firmly on principle in order to achieve what we are striving for: to use the enormous power of material incentives for increasing efficiency and quality of work, and for rational management of manpower.

## Standards Are the Basis

The adopted measures cannot deal with all problems that we must solve in the area of management. No system can work automatically and only in the positive direction. Moreover, the changes which we are introducing will necessarily give rise to many conflicts. We must therefore recognize the irreplaceable role of direct management, the very active and responsible role of the management personnel, of systematic improvement of methods, style and organization of the management work and of very effective political work.

This was very accurately expressed by Comrade Husak at the 14th plenary session of the CPCZ Central Committee, when he said: "Direct management in which there still are big shortcomings retains its irreplaceable importance. The central organs, economic production units and enterprises still cling too much to routine and cliches in this respect. Although we have some good examples and the tendency toward improvement is beginning to manifest itself, we have still not made the kind of progress that the present tasks require."

This is an accurate analysis of the situation which we must radically change in the coming period. The improvement of the system of the national economy management and the improvement of direct management are joined vessels and interdependent factors. This unity is particularly important now, when the system of management lays special emphasis on quality and efficiency.

One of the basic conditions for proper and effective working of the system of management and for the consistent application of the principle of individual merit is a substantial improvement of standards and calculations in the enterprise sphere.

The quality of standards underlying production is very unsatisfactory in our country. Although the situation varies by individual sectors, the general level of standards and standards-setting is so low that they cannot be always used as a realistic basis for planning and price-setting. After all, it can hardly be expected that it will be possible to set prices more correctly, to determine material incentives more justly, if we do not manage to achieve a substantial improvement in setting the standards for labor consumption, production cost, material and energy consumption.

The point is not only to have such standards set, but also to bring them continuously up-to-date because they must reflect the systematic increase in technical levels. They must literally materialize the scientific-technological progress and latest knowledge. Things must be done substantially better, more effectively. Not only that. We know that there are big differences in efficiency--although not in remuneration--among our plants and enterprises, that there are differences very often between individual workshops and departments. Some people know how to organize work better without

unnecessary losses. We need therefore to raise the level of those who lag behind and bring them to the level of those who are ahead.

there are by no means rare or isolated instances today that investment plans and projects for introduction of new production are approved without knowing in advance what this or that product will cost, how it will sell in the world markets, what social function it will perform. This makes it imperative for the enterprises to improve their activities in the area of investment, calculations, in comparing the planned and actual production results. In other words, we must count, count and count again.

Let me make one more observation. In connection with the new measures fear was expressed that many new laws will be passed, decrees and regulations issued, that the enterprises will be flooded with commands, that additional reports and statements will be required--in other words, that sterile bureaucracy will continue to burgeon.

The problem which I have just mentioned cannot be underestimated. All of us know that there are still enough people who instead of working diligently produce only paper work, and we could not make a bigger mistake than to tolerate it at this particular time. Before making a decision or issuing an order which calls for an administrative measure, everybody should first ask himself whether the order is necessary, rational, how much working time will be required for its elaboration and, above all, whether it will be reflected in the increase of production or its efficiency.

This is closely related also to the rationalization of the entire system of information. Many information centers have been set up, the number of computers has increased but so has the number of their operators in our country in the decade just passed. And yet, we are not able to say what is the ultimate effect of this expensive equipment or whether the large number of workers, released from other sectors and assigned to computer operation, has in any way contributed to the improvement of management standards or to the increase in efficiency of the national economy.

We have already made the decision that we must analyze the causes of the excessive increase in bureaucracy and bureaucratic procedures in order to simplify it substantially and make it gradually more economical.

#### What Kind of Managers Do We Need?

The key to coping with the tasks which we face in the area of direct management is in the people, in the improvement of relations among them, in the improvement of cadre work so that it meets the present and especially future needs.

We have a big staff of more than 200,000 managers at all levels of management. Most of them are experienced officials who achieved very good results in the past. They perform self-sacrificing work regardless of the time

involved and with greatest effort. It is, however, appropriate to say that besides them there are also many of those whose presence at the head of collectives is neither seen nor felt. We have qualified and capable people who have mastered the modern methods of management are demanding toward themselves as well as toward their fellow-workers and who even under difficult conditions achieve necessary results.

But we also have people who are no longer up to the present requirements as to the qualification or approach to the tasks. They dodge their responsibility, look for more comfortable, easier, riskless ways. They are not able to guide the collectives under their supervision according to the possibilities and needs of the society.

In addition to being politically mature, today's manager must be efficient, professionally very competent, properly acquainted with technology and aware of what is going on in the world. It is absolutely imperative that our managers become more flexible, more enterprising, and willing to assume reasonable risks. We lay special emphasis on the quality of their leadership of the enterprise collectives, on their ability to stimulate and organize initiative, to systematically uncover situations in which things can be improved to intensify cooperation between production collectives and to cultivate in them the feeling of co-responsibility for the results achieved by the enterprise and plant. Such is the type of manager whom the party and trade union organs should back by the full weight of their authority. Conversely, they should actively fight for dismissals in those instances where the manager is either not competent to perform his duties or gives priority to his own personal interests.

The Set of Measures Designed To Improve the Planned Management System of the National Economy contains many new features whose consistent implementation will result in a substantial improvement over the present situation.

We know that we have not solved all problems. There are areas which must be studied in the near future. Among them for example are: improvement of services by artisans and repairmen; fruit and vegetable growing and supply; more rapid development of production and consumer cooperatives, and so on. What is important then is not only the strict observance of established principles, but also the presentation of new proposals which should contribute to more effective management and better satisfaction of the population's needs.

There are, of course, people who may think that everything will be ideal after 1 January [1981]. Illusions and inactivity are the two principal dangers. The changes which we propose are a good beginning, the basis which must be further developed. The future belongs not to the alarmists or inactive onlookers, but to the people committed, efficient, enterprising, courageous, prudent. Without them, we cannot even visualize the translation of the new improved system of management into the reality. There are, of course, also people who constantly warn, lift their finger to advise caution and who would like best to leave things as they are today.

The Set of Measures contains important changes which will give rise also to conflicts, particularly with people whose work is mediocre and negligent. There will also be people who will find the new and demanding conditions not to their liking or, as they say, "against the grain." If we want to move forward, however, we must not be afraid of such conflicts. In the final analysis, we can largely avert such conflicts by effective political, organizational and professional work. In any case, in carrying out these changes we can count on the support of that majority of the working people which works honestly, of those who are interested in the rapid and successful solution of problems and elimination of existing shortcomings.

#### Basic Change Is the Order of the Day

We regard the approved measures as the beginning of our great effort to accomplish a rapid transition to the intensification of our economy, to higher productivity and efficiency. This change is the order of the day. If we do not carry it out with sufficient resolution, our difficulties will accumulate and will be projected into all spheres of social life, and will affect every citizen of this country. In the first place, we would thereby jeopardize the intentions and goals set by our communist party for the welfare of man, for the improvement of material conditions in his life and work, for an increasingly better satisfaction of his material and spiritual needs.

In its economic and social policy, the party has always fought for the principle that the increase in the living standard directly depends upon the resources which we produce. It has been said also--and this is doubly true today--that we cannot live on credit nor at the expense of the future development, at the expense of future generations. This principle applies not only generally, but it assumes a specific form in every workplace.

We are convinced that the Set of Measures creates prerequisites for us to make full use of the great internal force and reserves, to develop new initiative of people, to put into practice their good ideas and to win them over for the active participation in the solution of problems and fulfillment of the given tasks. Clear tasks, a well organized and rhythmic production process, effective material incentives--these are the factors which undoubtedly will favorably affect the attitude toward work, stimulate work morale and initiative, and counteract the purely formal pledges in socialist competition. We are convinced that the activity of workers will be possible to direct, in a much better way than before, to the qualitative plan indicators, to increasing the quality of products, to export competitiveness, to savings and better utilization of raw materials, energy and industrial materials.

We are convinced that this will be helped also by the international socialist competition for higher quality, technical standard and reliability of products, mutually exchanged among the socialist countries.

The adopted principles anticipate that the workers' participation will increase already during the preparation of the plan. We are reintroducing central planning which will increase the opportunities for the largest possible body of workers, particularly competing collectives, brigades of socialist labor, comprehensive rationalization brigades, innovators and improvers to help in uncovering weak spots to improve and in searching for ways to higher efficiency.

The role of collective agreements also will increase not only because they will better combine the material interests of collectives and individuals with the production of enterprise funds, but also because they will be signed for the 5-year period. The same will be true of the plans for cadres' training, personnel and social development.

In cooperation with the Central Council of Trade Unions, the federal government intends to review in the course of this year all previously adopted documents on development of workers' initiative and effect the necessary changes in accordance with the principles of the improved system of management.

I would like to emphasize again that the improvement of the system of management is not only one task out of many; it is a strategic tool for coping with progress in the 1980's, a tool which must be elaborated, perfected, employed, on an ever larger scale, and rendered more effective.

It will be the primary tasks of communists and particularly of economic managers to intensify the mass political and ideologically educational work and to properly and convincingly clarify the basic intentions underlying the new measures.

To put it briefly, this means that we should win over all the honest people for their support. We must persuade them that the new measures are in their final effect not only beneficial to society and to every individual but also that they are extremely urgent.

We shall have to wage a fierce struggle against passivity and conservatism which are sometimes supported and nurtured also by indolence and tendency to continue along the well-trodden paths. We know that the most difficult task will be to change people's thinking. We are convinced, however, that the overwhelming majority of our working people is interested in the healthy development of our society, and in a more just evaluation of the contribution and performance of every individual.

The CPCZ Central Committee expects that the consistent implementation of the entire Set of Measures will be backed with full weight and responsibility by our entire party, all party organs and organizations, and every communist. The point is that in the first place the communists must manage to properly elucidate and explain the changes in management and their

implications, and support everything that will help accomplish the set goals. At the same time, they must create such atmosphere in every workplace every day in which it will be possible to work efficiently, in which constructive criticism of shortcomings, responsible attitude of every worker toward the given tasks and uniform course of action of all in the implementation of intentions underlying the economic policy of our party will be a matter-of-course.

Naturally we expect that in this demanding activity effective assistance will be rendered by all mass organizations of the National Front, as well as by the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement and the Socialist Union of Youth.

The proposed changes in the management of our national economy pursue one single goal: we want to gradually create better conditions for further development of our entire socialist society. We want every family and every citizen in this state to lead a happy life. We want and must strive during these years to strengthen the economic base for the future generations.

This is a great and by no means an easy task. However, the CPCZ Central Committee, the federal government, the Central Council of Trade Unions, the governments of the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republic, the Central Committee of the National Front firmly believe that in its implementation, in securing further flourishing of our country, they will enjoy overall support of our working class, cooperative farmers, our intelligentsia as well as of other working people.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### BRIEFS

COMMANDERS' RALLY IN CSSR--Trencin, CTK--L. Pezlar, Slovak Communist Party Central Committee Presidium member and secretary, yesterday [23 April] addressed the Commanders' Rally organized by the command of the eastern military okrug; he spoke of the significance and implementation of the conclusions adopted by the 15th CPCZ Central Committee session. He stressed the significance of a comprehensive approach to ideological work, and the need for greater efficiency and effectiveness and for the leading workers to have a sense of responsibility for the training of people in their working collectives. He also acquainted those present with certain economic problems, and among other things with matters of cooperation and specialization and with problems of the domestic market. [Text] [AU300735 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Apr 80 p 2]

CSO: 2400

BOOK ON FRIENDSHIP TREATIES STRESSES STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Potsdam-Babelsberg STAAT UND RECHT in German Vol 29 No 1, Jan 80 signed to press 26 Nov 79 pp 91-94

[Review by Dr Juergen Herrmann, (East) Berlin of the book "Freundschaftsvertraege--Vertraege des Sozialismus" (Friendship Treaties--Treaties of Socialism) by Dr Herbert Kroeger and Frank Seidel, published by Staatsverlag der DDR, (East) Berlin, 1979, 78 pages]

[Text] The study analyzes the Friendship Treaties on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1975 and 1977 by the GDR with the USSR and other socialist countries primarily from the viewpoint of their importance as socialist standards of international law. At the same time the political and legal effect of these treaties on the development of relations between the GDR and their socialist partner countries is assessed and the consolidation of the community of socialist states in general and beyond that on their influence on the development of universally binding international law is evaluated.

In the first section, the conclusion of the new friendship treaties is convincingly characterized as the result of new conditions created since the end of the sixties which reflects the change in the international balance of power in favor of socialism.

The discussion of the role of international law generally and in relations between socialist fraternal countries in particular is preceded in the second section by several basic observations on various aspects of the relationship between the foreign policy of states and the application of international law for the justification and grounding of fundamental political positions and for raising justified claims, but at the same time the danger of harboring legal illusions is stressed. Then the convincing point is made that the fundamental nature of mutual relations between socialist states fashioned by socialist internationalism assumes an especially authoritative expression by exact formulation and the mutually binding nature of legal obligations derived therefrom. This in turn strengthens the perception of other states of the stability of mutual relations between contractual partners.

The exposition on the new class content and legal standing of the friendship treaties as treaties between socialist states is worth mentioning. While recognizing that the content of international treaties and thereby their political and social nature is always determined by the political interests and objectives of the participating states the claim is upheld that the international legal arrangements in agreements between socialist states contain qualitatively new legal principles whose social and economic basis is rooted in the same socialist production conditions and the same social order of the states resulting in a corresponding, qualitatively new, higher type of international relations (p 23 f).

Kroeger and Seidel identify the new dimension in the international arrangement of relations between socialist states: As an expression of the political will of the working class and related classes and population strata in these states, the relations are based "on a will rooted in class consciousness which, while manifested in political actions of different states which, due to objectively or subjectively differently perceived interests, may differ in their approach to individual problems but in essential respects conform because of the historical identity of the mission of the international working class (p 29). This is in accord with Lenin's dialectic interpretation of the connection between the national and international aspects of international treaties between socialist states which in the exercise of foreign policy makes it necessary to take into account the existence of differences in national interests of individual socialist states in the political and legal formulation of their mutual relations by reconciling their national differences with their common interest.

Important here are also their observations on the relationship between the specifically socialist view of principles of international law. On this subject the authors formulate and postulate the thesis that in arranging their mutual relations socialist states "cannot limit themselves only to application of principles of international law which apply to all states irrespective of their social order if such arrangement is to do justice to the conditions and requirements of the new type of their mutual relations. Rather, while complying with the elementary principles of universally valid international law which apply also to them...they must gradually develop principles governing their mutual international relations in accordance with their socialist class system which will secure, strengthen and consolidate these interstate relations in all respects." (p 30).

The third section explains how the friendship treaties contribute to the acknowledgment, strengthening and also to the refinement and continued development of principles of socialist international law. The analysis results in the formulation of six fundamental legal principles and the interpretation of rights and obligations deriving from them. To deal with the interesting details of these observations exceeds the scope of this review but their theoretical and practical importance deserves to be emphasized because of the contribution which these treaties have brought to the formulation of principles of socialist internationalism as fundamental principles of international law. This is the more important because so far no multi-

laterally agreed-upon principles of international law exist which would reflect socialist internationalism.

Credit is due the authors for their generally valid theoretical evaluation of the legal content of stipulations of the friendship treaties, demonstration of their worth as binding principles of international law and the proper identification of socialist internationalism as the mandatory link between the complex of socialist principles of international law within the context of the historical developmental process. Picking the principle of socialist internationalism as the rightful common trait of these treaties and their objectives and as the most essential and comprehensive expression of the completely new nature of socialist international treaties is fully justified. Perhaps greater emphasis should have been placed on the dialectic tie between socialist ideology and socialist internationalism on one side, and state interests, their expression in international socialist treaties, which in turn are reflected in interstate relations, on the other. The refined definition of the concept of sovereignty of socialist states is also of interest in that it emphasizes that "the application of the legal principles of respect for sovereignty, independence, equality and noninvolvement governing the relations between socialist states is rooted in the very nature of proletarian or socialist internationalism and the class character of socialist interstate relations" and that, therefore, "sovereignty of socialist states as such is determined by the international nature of socialism" and is consequently "primarily a factor of unity of the states of the socialist community where in turn the community is a guarantor of sovereignty of every individual state." (p 47 f). On this point, Section 5 takes sharp issue with the distortions of bourgeois theoreticians of international law who set the tone in their ideological war on socialism in the realm of theory and in the exercise of international law by their claim that socialist states allegedly do not recognize the universally binding principles of international law and their attacks on the nature and observation of the concept of sovereignty of socialist states in their mutual relations.

The fourth section deals with the international impact of the new friendship treaties and the sixth section assesses the effect of the treaties on the future development of the scope and continued refinement of socialist international law as a whole.

Kroeger and Seidel's publication is of considerable theoretical and practical interest because it does not simply offer comments on friendship treaties but is a theoretical assessment of their scope representing an important contribution to the theory of international law. By clarifying the dialectic nature of international law and foreign policy it also offers many suggestions on the application of internationally binding treaty stipulations in formulating relations with fraternal socialist countries in the practical exercise of foreign policy.

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METHODS, RESULTS OF PERSONALITY RESEARCH EXAMINED

Cologne DEUTSCHLAND-ARCHIV in German Vol 13 No 3, Mar 80 signed to press 22 Feb 80 pp 271-275

[Article by Christiane Lemke: "Personality Research in the GDR--Sociological and Psychological Problems"]

[Text] During the past few years, social science research in the socialist countries has increasingly turned to problems of personality development. The theoretical and empirical research in this area is of particular interest for coming to grips with the social systems of these countries since experiences and insights concerning the subjective aspect of social transformation processes are digested here to a high degree. In what follows a glimpse into the questions raised and the findings of theoretical personality research in the GDR is to be conveyed on the basis of a number of recent publications.

1. Focal Points of Personality Research

Contributions to personality research were made by various branches of science during the past years. The focal points here lay in the psychological, sociological and pedagogical area. The research plan for the social sciences, which determines the focal points of research in the central institutes and institutions in the GDR, such as, for example, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences in Berlin or the Central Institute for Youth Research in Leipzig, established the following contents for the individual disciplines for the years 1976-1980<sup>1</sup>: Psychology is to make a substantial contribution to the elaboration of scientific foundations for the development of socialist personalities and collectives. In cooperation with philosophy and other social sciences, it has the task of intensifying research on ideological and theoretical problems of personality psychology.<sup>2</sup> Sociology is to concentrate on the development of socialist collectives and personalities within the framework of the analysis of fundamental social processes.<sup>3</sup> Pedagogy has the task of developing scientific bases for the formation and education of socialist personalities and their development in the collectives of society.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the research plan also designates formulations of questions for political science and jurisprudence, the science of art and culture, as well as philology, under which they are to make a contribution to the investigation of personality.

A portion of personality research is carried out by the central institutions, in particular by the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences and its various institutes, by the Central Institute for Youth Research, as well as by the Institute for Social Sciences attached to the SED Central Committee. But the colleges, too, have been involved in personality research with sociological, psychological and pedagogical investigations. Before taking up some of these investigations, we will briefly describe the methods used in personality research to inquire into the empirical relationships.

## 2. Methods in Personality Research

The methods used in personality research do not fundamentally differ from those of other social science research areas in the GDR; to be sure, some peculiarities are observable here which emanate from the specific subject of research.

An introduction into personality research composed by associates of the Central Institute for Youth Research provides a comprehensive overview of the current substantive and methodological problems of this research area.<sup>5</sup> In so doing, the authors proceed from the concept of personality developed by psychology, which emphasis the "inner" conditions for the behavior of the personality and makes possible an inquiry into the respective subjective structures and processes. The "inner" conditions, which have developed under the influence of social circumstances, are differentiated into capabilities and attitudes (character attributes) of the personality. In order to be able to investigate the latter, concrete behavior modes and their motives must be analyzed since attitudes themselves cannot be directly observed.<sup>6</sup>

The method employed most frequently in personality research is that of questioning. It is carried out in different forms: in writing, orally, semi- or fully standardized, and so on. The objective for the most part is to ascertain personal attitudes or motivations that are relevant in social contexts. Thus, for example, attitudes toward professional activity, job satisfaction or motivation for further education are disclosed through questioning.<sup>7</sup> To support the investigation of attitudes, moreover, attitude and value scales are employed.

Another method of personality research is that of observation, which takes place either as participant or nonparticipant observation. In assessing the value of this method, the authors from the Central Institute for Youth Research come to the conclusion that, while it offers advantages in many cases, it should be combined with other procedures if possible.<sup>8</sup> To be sure, the scientific literature to date contains hardly any reports on empirical results of personality research that were obtained by the use of this method.

The group-diagnostic procedure is entered separately by the authors although this work entails mainly observations and questioning.<sup>9</sup> These methods, however, have been further developed for the specific conditions in groups. The group-diagnostic procedure is important in personality research in so far

as it entails the investigation of social relations--in the collective--which play an important role for the development of the personality.<sup>10</sup> These procedures are of special significance in the school and professional spheres.

The attitude test or the personality questionnaire are widespread in personality research. They find application, above all, in the school sphere and in psychodiagnosis.<sup>11</sup>

### 3. The Investigation of the Personality in the Work Process

From the standpoint of contents, a relatively large area of personality research deals with investigations which concern themselves with the relation of personality development and professional activity. In so doing, the research proceeds from the Marxist thesis that the development of the individual personality is determined by the organization of social labor.<sup>12</sup> Empirical personality research, to be sure, does not so much deal with the investigation of the influence of the organization of social labor on the position of the individual in the production and reproduction process of society and thus on his working and living conditions. The investigations carried out by sociologists and psychologists concentrate rather on the direct influence of the activity in the respective work process. Since the working class is regarded as the main social group, most of the investigations deal with the professional activity of industrial workers, male and female, who in accordance with class determination form the "nucleus" of the working class.<sup>13</sup>

#### a) Point of Departure: Content of Work

The content of work is designated in the sociological literature and the literature on labor psychology as the decisive point of departure for the investigation of the personality. Investigations demonstrate that the content of work influences not only the general job satisfaction, but, for example, also the style of social relations in the work collective and the motivation to achieve higher qualifications.

The sociologists Helmut Rabe and Klaus-Peter Schwitzer document the relation between the content of work and personality development on the basis of an empirical investigation, which was carried out by the field of sociology of the section of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy at Humboldt University in Berlin.<sup>14</sup> This involved the ascertainment of the general attitude toward work among production workers of the construction and electronics industry in Berlin in a survey through the following indicators: "Work is nothing more than a necessity in order to earn one's living and constantly increase one's standard of living." -- "Work is also an opportunity to make a contribution to the further development of society and thereby make oneself useful to society." -- "Work is also an opportunity to prove to oneself and to others what one can do, to prove one's own ability and to confirm oneself." The resulting findings showed that the first attitude, which was expressed by a total of 51.3 percent of those surveyed, was especially prevalent among those whose work is physically heavy, damaging to health and very monotonous,

while the second attitude (29.0 percent) was observable, above all, among those whose work is mentally strenuous, requires much thought and entails a high degree of responsibility.<sup>15</sup> It turns out, in other words, that the perception of the social significance of work varies depending on the content of work. Beyond this, correlations between the content of work and participation in the movement for innovation and the attitude toward leisure time could be shown.

Rabe and Schwitzer, however, speak against the assumption of a direct and exclusive relation between the content of work and personality development. Such a close relationship, for example, is suggested by the approach of the Dresden labor and engineering psychologist Winfried Hacker, who among all the working conditions ascribes to the contents a direct significance for the development of personality traits.<sup>16</sup>

Rabe and Schwitzer, by contrast, present a more comprehensive concept, according to which, for one thing, work does not influence all "personality sectors," but especially those which relate directly to work. For another, they take the position that the development of the personality is never exclusively determined by work, but must also be investigated within the context of leisure and family problems.

#### b) Structures of Expectation With Regard to Work and Factory

Information concerning subjective experiences of the personality in the professional sphere is provided by an investigation described by Herbert F. Wolf, which was carried out at the professorial chair for sociology of Karl Marx University in Leipzig.<sup>17</sup> It proceeds from the assumption that the personality orients itself on the basis of "guiding images" and therefore has certain expectations with regard to its social environment. These expectations, when confronted with reality, trigger either reactions of satisfactions or disappointment and give information about motives for action.

In surveys of approximately 1,900 workers and 900 members of the intelligentsia in 11 plants (heavy machine building, machine building, assembly plant, chemistry, research center), Wolf has investigated the structures of expectation in regard to work and plant. In so doing, those surveyed were given these eight characteristics: high wages, good possibilities for improving one's qualifications and for development, interesting and responsible work, good social services in the plant, good superiors, good comradeship in the work collective, modern working conditions, easy work (or high prestige of the job position). The structures of satisfaction were ascertained according to the same characteristics.

From the investigation into the structures of expectation and satisfaction one can derive not only certain group-specific "guiding images"--thus, for example, college and technical school cadres express most frequently the expectation to be able to engage in interesting, responsible activity, while production workers above all expect high wages--but there also become clear fields of conflict which result from expectations, on the one hand, and the satisfaction of expectations, on the other. Thus, for example, the high expectations of the production workers with regard to pay and modern working conditions in the plants that were investigated are to a large extent not

fulfilled. The investigation makes clear how social relations are subjectively experienced by those affected and what underlying factors of social action by the personality result from the specific professional activity.

### On Personality Research in Psychology

In psychology, discussions of research problems relating to the psychology of the personality began relatively early. Ever since the Jena psychologist Hans Niebach at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s advocated the development of a psychology of the personality,<sup>18</sup> this field of research has been continually expanded, so that in the meantime numerous publications are available.<sup>19</sup> In addition to labor psychology, it is, above all, pedagogical psychology which has taken up personality-relevant research, since the development and education processes are regarded as the most important field of personality development. Especially in the school sphere, a number of problems developed as a result of the educational reform of 1965, problems which required psychological and pedagogical investigations. In this context, personality research received impulses from the work of two research groups which explained personality development in the educational process as the result of the internalizations of norms or motive-dependent value relations.<sup>20</sup> Problems in developmental psychology, too, were investigated under the formulation of the question of the interrelationship of biological and social aspects of personality formation.<sup>21</sup> At present, psychology is conducting research on the "total personality" within the framework of concrete activity. The Institute for Pedagogic Psychology of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences has summarized the results of this research in a basic work.<sup>22</sup> In conformity with the underlying concept of personality, "activity-centered" research approaches and results are presented here in the main.

Insight into research on personality psychology is also provided by the volume edited by Manfred Vorverg, which in the main contains contributions by associates of the psychology section of Karl Marx University in Leipzig.<sup>23</sup> According to Vorverg, research in personality psychology has the function of reexecuting and explaining fundamental psychic processes that develop on the basis of socially transmitted "activity requirements" on the level of individual behavior modes. It is primarily understood as action analysis of one or several individuals.<sup>24</sup> The research project "Social Competence as End Value for Personality Structure and Behavior Modification" of Leipzig University, which is presented in the contributions is supposed to make this action-oriented personality research more concrete. In so doing, conflict theory approaches, too, are introduced into the research.<sup>25</sup>

### FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. "Central Research Plan of the Marxist-Leninist Social Sciences of the GDR 1976-1980," in EINHEIT, 9, 1975, pp 1042-1061. The research area of the social sciences includes philosophy, economic sciences, sociology, social policy and demography, theory and history of science, political science and jurisprudence, historical science, pedagogy,

psychology, science of culture and art, philology, scientific communism, research on Marx, Engels and Lenin, as well as research on foreign policy and international development.

2. Ibid., p 1049.
3. Ibid., p 1045.
4. Ibid., p 1048 ff.
5. Werner Hennig (editor), "On the Investigation of the Personality," Berlin (GDR), 1978. The authors base themselves in this on Walter Friedrich, Werner Hennig (editors), "The Social Science Research Process," Berlin (GDR), 1975.
6. Cf. Ibid., p 13 ff. In what follows, the authors describe the stages of the research process and the most important methods of research.
7. Cf., for example, the empirical investigations listed in the collection "On the Social Position of the Woman in the GDR," published by the scientific advisory council "The Woman in Socialist Society," Berlin (GDR).
8. Cf. Hennig (editor), "On the Investigation" (Note 5), p 127 ff.
9. Ibid., p 159 ff.
10. Cf. also Manfred Vorweg, "Analyses of the Sociopsychological Structure of Collectives," Berlin (GDR), 1966.
11. Cf. Hennig (editor), "On the Investigation" (Note 5), p 150 ff. Gerhard Lehwald, "On the Examination of the Validity of a Personality Questionnaire Through the Use of the Principles of Reconstruction Validation," in Manfred Vorweg (editor), "On Psychological Personality Research," Berlin (GDR), pp 89-100.
12. Cf. on this also Lucien Seve, "Marxism and Theory of the Personality," Third ed., Frankfurt/Main, 1977.
13. In the social structure of society, two main classes are distinguished: The working class (79.5 percent of the working population) and the class of the cooperative peasants (7 percent); in addition, the stratum of the intelligentsia (10 percent), and the stratum of the cooperative and private craftsmen and tradesmen (3.5 percent). Cf. Rudi Weidig, "Basic Processes of the Social Approximation of the Classes and Strata in the GDR," in DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, 7, 1978, p 814.
14. Cf. Helmut Rabe, Klaus-Peter Schwitzer, "Work and Personality Development," in L. P. Bujewa, Toni Hahn (editor), "On the Socialist Personality," Berlin (GDR), 1978, pp 23-56. "The Concept of Personality and the Develop-

ment of the Socialist Personality in the Working Class in the Building of the Developed Socialist Society. Theses," in WISSENSCHAFTLICHE ZEITUNG DER HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN, Social Science and Philological Series, 1, 1977, pp 141-146.

15. Cf. Rabe, Schwitzer, "Work and Personality Development" (Note 14), p 40. The third attitude was expressed by 19.7 percent of those surveyed.
16. Cf. in particular Winfried Hacker, "Interrelations Between Working Conditions and Personality Development," in PAEDAGOGIK, 1, Beiheft (Supplement), 1976, pp 28-34.
17. Cf. Herbert F. Wolf, "Guiding Images and Expectations as Factors of Socialist Personality Development and Socialist Action," in L. P. Bujewa, Toni Hahn (editors), "On the Socialist Personality," Berlin (GDR), 1978, pp 124-141.
18. Cf. in particular Hans Hiebsch, "Fundamental Questions of Marxist Personality Psychology," in PROBLEME UND ERGEBNISSE DER PSYCHOLOGIE, 7, 1973, pp 1-19.
19. Cf., for example, Guenther Clauss, Adolf Kossakowski (editors), "Pedagogic-Psychological Contributions to the Development of Socialist Personalities," Berlin (GDR), 1974; Hans Hiebsch, "Sociopsychological Foundations of Personality Formation," Berlin (GDR), 1969; Adolf Kossakowski, Karlheinz Otto (editor), "Psychological Investigations of the Development of Socialist Personalities," Berlin (GDR), 1973.
20. In question is a study circle of Kossakowski (at the time Karl Marx University Leipzig), on the one hand, and Rosenfeld (Humboldt University Berlin), on the other. Cf. Adolf Kossakowski, "On the Theory of Behavior Education," in PROBLEME UND ERGEBNISSE DER PSYCHOLOGIE, No 30, 1969, pp 71-88; Gerhard Rosenfeld, "Value and Motive-Theoretical Conception of the Educational Process," in *ibid.*, pp 47-69.
21. Cf. possibly Werner Naumann, "Introduction into Pedagogy," Berlin (GDR), 1975, pp 56 ff.; Irene Doelling, "Natural Character, Individual, Personality. People and Their Biological Constitution in the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Culture," Berlin (East), 1979. Doelling is working on the problems with a view to the culture of the working class.
22. Cf. Adolf Kossakowski, et al., "Psychological Foundations of Personality Development in the Pedagogical Process," Berlin (GDR), 1977 (and Cologne, 1977).
23. Cf. Manfred Vorweg (editor), "On Psychological Personality Research," Vol 1, Berlin (GDR), 1978.

24. Ibid., p 11 ff.
25. Cf. Erika Maiwald, Dieter Maiwald, "On the Problem of an Attitude-Determined Conflict Readiness," in Manfred Vorweg (editor), "On Psychological Personality Research," Vol 1, Berlin (GDR), 1978, pp 64-79.

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## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### AIR DEFENSE RADAR OPERATOR DUTY DESCRIBED

East Berlin AR ARMEE RUNDSCHAU in German No 4, Apr 80 signed to press  
31 Jan 80 pp 44-47

[Article by Lt Col Horst Spickereit: "As if It Depended on Him Alone"]

[Text] We are inside one of our air defense radar installations. The radar technician's eyes are glued to the radar screen, on which a bright beam continuously circles around its axis and illuminates target blips, some of them no bigger than the head of a pin. Hit by the electron beam during their progress, they glimmer briefly and fade away. Dozens of these blips are distributed all over the screen. Some of them remain stationary; they are stationary objects. But most of them are moving, at a snail's pace. These are aerial targets--at thousands of meters altitude, moving at a speed of almost 1,000 kilometers per hour or even faster.

Above the screen a miniature camera is mounted which takes photographs of the air situation. Inasmuch as the picture on the screen changes with every revolution of the antenna, the film records the track of the flying objects. By exercising objective control in this manner, the comrades inside the command post make a permanent record of changes in the air situation and can analyze its status at any time.

The radar operator continuously talks numbers into the microphone attached to his headset. He reports the target coordinates within the sector under his surveillance. This information is transmitted to the command post. On a board taller than a man, which is a scale reproduction of the radar screen, interpreters reproduce the track of the aerial vehicles. This creates a pictorial display of the air situation within the assigned air space, to form a basis for the commanders' and duty officers' decisions in the operational headquarters.

A radar operator is thus engaged at his place of duty for several hours. He works in isolation, without visual or acoustic communication to the exterior or to the combat area. His weapon is his electronic gear. His job is merely to sit there and watch.

Merely?

The radar technical units are known as the eyes of air defense. A radar technician is able to observe and reconnoiter air space within a radius of several hundred kilometers. Since his radius of observation extends far beyond our national borders, he recognizes air movements which could constitute a threat. He is the forward sentry. He knows that behind him are his comrades of other services who rely on his alertness; also, the people in villages and cities who depend on his protection. But this does not merely include the motorized infantrymen and the sailors, the pilots and tank soldiers of his own armed forces. Nor does it include only the citizens of Rostock and Erfurt. The homeland in its largest sense--the socialist homeland--being guarded by the radar man does not end at the Oder or at the Erz Mountains. It also comprises Prague, Warsaw, Moscow--the Warsaw Pact states. Our allies. Radar technicians are deployed at a critical sector of the coordinated socialist defense efforts since they are the first ones to recognize an aerial adversary. Everyone assigned to this forward sentry post bears responsibility for ensuring the integrity of our nations' air defense in a permanent, impenetrable and effective manner. To prevent bombs or rockets from striking our territory. To keep our skies clear. A responsibility involving millions!

Class conscious soldiers are required for this task. Radar operators who understand that here, in the front lines, no lapses of attention are permissible. Not for 1 second. This is a mission which absorbs every ounce of his being. As if everything depended on him alone...

But is political responsibility sufficient for this? Must it not be complemented with outstanding technical capability? A radar operator must be able to absorb the overall air situation; to penetrate the enemy's intentions; to recognize his actions. He must be able to interpret unequivocally the continuous appearance and fading of all the blips on his screen. The key for this is his understanding of the enemy. Which of his airfields are in my immediate area? What types of aircraft are stationed there? How do tactical formations appear on my screen? How do I recognize target combinations and target separation? In the constantly changing combat situation his memory must be infallible.

The critical characteristics of his activities are timely spotting of aerial objects; reporting them; their clear identification and their persistent tracking. If, for example, he delays spotting a Phantom fighter-bomber by 20 seconds, the latter can, at a speed of 1,600 km per hour, travel more than 8 km toward our border without being recognized.

To identify means to recognize aerial objects from their size, movement and the intensity of the blips they form on the screen. Is it an aircraft, a missile? What type? Another example: the enemy deploys radar-confusing missiles. Their blips on the screen are considerably smaller, have much lower light intensity. If the radar man does not realize this immediately

and fails to call for defensive measures, his own site may quickly be destroyed. Exact identification also included recognizing the exact number of aircraft. Any errors in this respect entail inappropriate decisions. If the radar operator reports too many targets, too great a number of our aircraft are deployed. While this may generate air superiority, the super-numerary aircraft would be missed in other locations where they might be more urgently needed. If on the other hand the comrade reports too few targets, too few fighters are dispatched; we would obviously be outnumbered and no effective defense could take place. A chain reaction--triggered by insufficient attention and capability of a single individual!

Continuous tracking of the flying object: once the radar operator has spotted the object, he must not lose it or permit it to elude him through flight maneuvers. Here for example is a strategic reconnaissance aircraft, flying in the stratosphere at 2,400 km per hour. To lose it for just 30 seconds means an uncontrolled air space of 20 km and the possibility of not recognizing another maneuver performed by that aircraft at all.

Is it not true then that utmost concentration on the part of the comrade watching the screen is indispensable? At times the many blinking blips appear to be confusing. At the center of the screen, equivalent to the location of the antenna, he sees the local "rose." This is the term for local echos reflected from fixed targets such as tall structures in the immediate vicinity and the topography of the area surrounding the site. Other blips are distributed across the screen. Which of these constitute important information for me, such as flying objects which are potentially dangerous to us? On the other hand, which ones are merely static or radar artifacts? These are questions which a practiced operator must be able to answer within seconds. And all this operational activity is proceeding under conditions which are not always easy. The radar operator is working in a cramped cubicle, in semidarkness. A small amount of illumination comes from the cathode ray tubes, the red and green pilot lights, the illuminated dials. Fans and motors give off a monotonous hum, relays are clicking. Some of the instruments radiate heat. The comrade on duty must be alert not only to the display on the screen; he must also watch the pilot lamps and the noises made by the machinery. He must also be aware of what goes on inside of them to a certain extent; if necessary, to detect small irregularities and defects in their functioning and to remedy them without immediately having to call for his superior and to wait for him to appear without taking any action himself.

These are stresses which at times can be taxing and extreme. This makes it all the more important for the radar operator to practice psychological stability so as to be able to accomplish his tasks from one minute to the next. A radar operator is a combatant whose function is much more than merely sitting and watching.

BRIEFS

**BRITISH JURISTS DELEGATION**--A delegation of democratic jurists from Great Britain studied the socialist administration of justice and the social activities of jurists in the GDR. The delegation visited the republic last week at the invitation of the Association of GDR Jurists. The guests, members of the "Haldane Society" professional association, conducted for this purpose numerous meetings with colleagues, lay judges and the members of social courts in Berlin, Eisenhuettenstadt, Potsdam and Dresden. In a statement the delegation, jointly with the GDR jurists association, denounced the NATO missile decisions which are threatening peace. [Text] [AUI60926 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 14 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

**SWEDISH YOUNG COMMUNISTS DELEGATION**--A delegation of the Communist Youth of Sweden (KU) under the leadership of Deputy Chairman Stellan Hermansson met for cordial talks with Gunter Rettner, secretary of the FDJ Central Council, at the weekend. In the past few days the guests studied problems related to the socialist education system and to youth's leisure time activities. In the joint communique the FDJ and KU denounced the Brussels NATO missile decisions. They valued the Soviet Berlin peace and disarmament initiatives. The two associations vigorously opposed Carter's appeal for a boycott of the Olympics. The FDJ and KU will further deepen their relations and coordinated appropriate measures for this purpose. [Text] [AUI60926 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 14 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

**AFRICAN TEACHERS' COURSE**--A 7-week teaching course for school officials from the republics of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde ended on Thursday [10 April] in Potsdam. In the course of the exchange of experience with GDR teachers and school counselors, the African pedagogs acquainted themselves with educational and teaching problems at Potsdam school. [East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 11 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

**SED DELEGATION IN ANGOLA**--Lucio Lara, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the MPLA Labor Party, received on Thursday [10 April] the SED Central Committee delegation under the leadership of Horst Brasch, member of the SED Central Committee, which is currently visiting Luanda. In their talks the two sides praised the successful development of collaboration between the SED and the MPLA Labor Party on the basis of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the

GDR and Angola. Lucio Lara briefed the SED delegation about the successful preparations for the first extraordinary MPLA-Labor Party Congress which will take place in Luanda in December. Topical problems of the present international situation were other subjects of the talks. [Text]  
[AU150828 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 12-13 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

NICARAGUANS IN GDR HOSPITALS--Another 17 Nicaraguan patriots departed by an Interflug plane for home on Friday night [4 April]. Many liberation strugglers have learned to walk again on artificial legs in hospitals of the capital thanks to sacrificing assistance. The plane also carries 15 tons of solidarity goods for Nicaragua. The solidarity shipment--financed with donations of the GDR population--is the fourth in a short time. [Text] [AU090754 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 5-6 Apr 80 p 1 AU]

MANAGUA SOLIDARITY CARGO--An Interflug charter plane carrying 17 Nicaraguan patriots arrived in Managua on Friday [4 April] (local time). Hundreds of relatives and friends had gathered at the airport to welcome the patriots whose grave wounds had been cured in the GDR. The solidarity cargo transported at the same time was handed over to representatives of the FSLN national leadership and of the Nicaraguan Education Ministry. [Text]  
[AU090754 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 7 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

EVANGELICAL CHURCH SYNOD--On Friday [11 April] the synod of the Evangelical Church has convened for 5 days of deliberations at Berlin-Weissensee. It will deal with reports of the church leadership as well as of the diaconal service and will continue the discussion on the Eisenach recommendations of early 1979 for the establishment of the United Evangelical Church in the GDR. A lecture by Bishop D. Dr. Albrecht Schoenherr about "professing and profession today" concluded the first day of deliberations. The report prepared by the church leadership for the synod refers to the significance of the church's commitment to disarmament and peace, generally "recognized and appreciated as an independent contribution of the churches toward peace and detente." The church leadership points out: "Our mission and the dangerous world situation challenge us to encourage talks and to endorse the continuation of the detente process." [East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 12-13 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

NEW SED BEZIRK SECRETARY--On Friday, 11 April 1980 the SED Erfurt Bezirk Management held a meeting. The bezirk management complied with the personal wish of Comrade Alois Braeutigam to relieve him for health reasons from the post of first secretary of the bezirk management. Comrade Gerhard Mueller, hitherto 2d secretary of the Neubrandenburgh Bezirk Management, was coopted into the Erfurt Bezirk Management and unanimously elected its first secretary. [East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 12-13 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

GDR-MEXICAN NAVIGATION RATIFICATION--"Deputy Mexican Foreign Minister Alfonso Rosenzweig Diaz and GDR Ambassador Peter Lorf exchanged the ratification instruments on the agreement on maritime navigation between the government of the GDR and the government of Mexico on Wednesday in Mexico City." The agreement had been signed in September 1979 in Berlin. [AU121348 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 10 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

GDR TRAVEL AGENCY IN TOKYO--An office of the GDR travel agency was opened on Tuesday [8 Apr] in Tokyo, complying with the wishes of the Japan travel agency partners and the growing number of Japanese tourists travelling to the GDR. Dr Illgen, deputy director-general of the GDR travel agency, reported that about 10,000 Japanese tourists visited the GDR last year, which represents a twofold rise over 1978. [East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 10 Apr 80 p 2 AU]

CSO: 2300

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON PARTY EDUCATIONAL DIRECTORATES

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Mar 80 p 5

[Interview with Bela Kopeczi, academician, deputy executive secretary of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Dr Gyula Mona, deputy chief of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) Central Committee (KB); Dr Jozsef Szabo, rector of the Political Academy of the MSZMP KB; Dr Gyorgy Ekler, secretary of the Szabolcs-Szatmar Megye Party Committee; Dr Istvan Kurucz and Dr Tibor Ungor, directors of the Educational Directorate of Budapest and Szolnok Megye-s, respectively, by Istvan Koncz]

[Text] There are 21 educational directorates in the country under guidance of the Budapest and megye party committees. A round table discussion on their role and far-reaching activities, and the level and success of their work was recently organized. Participants were: Bela Kopeczi, Drs Gyula Mona, Jozsef Szabo, Gyorgy Ekler, Istvan Kurucz and Tibor Ungor.

[Question] What is the task of the educational directorates? What form is used by them for political instruction, education and training?

[Gyula Mona] The educational directorates form the backbone of intermediate political training within our propaganda system. The highest level of political training is provided by the Political Academy of the MSZMP. The national network of educational directorates had been developed during the 1960's and their organization was completed more than 10 years ago. In each megye an average of 12 to 13 full time educators belong to the directorates as well as 80 to 120 honorary or part time teachers amounting to more than 2000 individuals nationally. This is an enormous and concentrated intellectual force which can and must be relied on, above all, for political work, Marxist-Leninist propaganda, and for theoretical and ideological activities.

Their main task is to prepare politically and ideologically the intermediate level leaders--basic party organization and local mass organization officials, national and economic leaders and propagandists--for their profession, to maintain and to develop further their preparedness. Their nationwide audience

has amounted to a steady 70 thousand every year for a long time. Ten thousand of them attend party boarding schools and 60 thousand learn their Marxism-Leninism in night schools. Of these 60 thousand, 35 thousand attend a 3-year university at night and 25 thousand attend various advanced training courses, mostly specialist-training courses. The attendance at basic and advanced training courses is gradually shifting in favor of the latter. This indicates a steady increase in the political and ideological preparedness and accomplishments of the leaders and officials. About two-thirds of the graduates will become active in propaganda later. Thus the effect of the educational directorates reaches a very broad range of party members and non-member workers.

Two important current steps were: as of last year, a new system of the mentioned specialized courses was introduced and the other was the basic material for the uniform teaching of Marxism-Leninism nationwide was put together. This will be used at the night university of the educational directorates as well as in national higher education--at universities and academies alike. In the future, this will bring to an equal level the Marxist-Leninist training of those who finished at universities or academies with those starting as physical laborers who reach some political or social position, or a position of economic leadership.

[Question] The 26 October 1976 resolution of the MSZMP KB contains, as its central thought, the improvement of the quality of propaganda activities which includes raising the standards of Marxist-Leninist teaching, education and training. How is this being realized in recent years by the educational directorates?

[Tibor Ungor] The resolution referred to was based on already existing results: on the fact that, within the existing organization framework and with quantitatively optimal--about 3,000 participants annually in our megye--, the conditions for improvement of standards are given. Ever since the XI Party Congress, we have been planning this under guidance of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the KB, and of the megye party committee. This means, above all, that a stricter and tighter organization will be coupled with a high degree of flexibility. In an average of 20 to 25 types of courses every year, we deal with 40 to 45 types of topics which include the central basic material and information to satisfy the particular requirements of the megye in a ratio of 60 and 40 percent, respectively.

For a year and a half we have used a new method to test the knowledge level of our students. The method of teaching and training has also been modified. The range of the old-time seminar type activities was narrowed and that of practical activities was broadened. For instance, at various enterprises and plants, we use their real problems to practice the process of decision preparation, decisionmaking and so on. With some groups we visit mass communication institutions in Budapest--television, radio, editorial offices--to observe their work from the inside. To face the increasing requirements of

today and of tomorrow, we are preparing our students for practical political activities which are modern, have a broad scope and have a theoretical basis.

[Istvan Kurucz] The work carried out by the educational directorates involves considerably more today than party education in the traditional sense. Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the political economics of capitalism and socialism as well as the history of the international and Hungarian workers' movements obviously remain in the center of the studies. Built on these three principal topics, however, the various courses and special lectures offer a broad choice of the various stages: sociology, economic policy, party building, ethics, esthetics, religious criticism, pedagogy, leadership theory, etc. More than party education is also involved insofar as we provide for the political-ideological education of a broad range of intellectuals outside of the party. Large numbers of technicians, physicians and pedagogists are also receiving instruction. Recently concluded was a 2 year special college for young writers and poets, organized jointly with the writers' union, and also one dealing with esthetic problems which was organized for the artists of the National Theater and of the Madach Theater. This year, jointly with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and with the Union of Public Employees, we organized advanced marxist education of about 80 research scientists. In general, we will organize the type of course with the kind of topic at any location where there is a political need for it. We offer a broad selection and want the greatest number of people to benefit from it.

But this also presents certain difficulties. The character and function of our basic courses is generally known to basic party organizations. They know whom to send to these and whom to recommend to the district party committees for indoctrination. But of course they cannot keep up with the possibilities of the advanced courses, especially of the special lectures which are quite varied and change every year. Therefore, indoctrination must be continuously planned and coordinated each year by the leadership of the basic organizations and by officials of the district party committees.

[Question] The educational directorates and the Political Academy have various functions but are nevertheless sister organizations in the final analysis. Is there any work interaction between them and what kind?

[Jozsef Szabo] According to the resolutions and guidelines of our higher party organizations, our academy--which is an institute of higher education--also serves as a center of contextual and methodological orientation for the educational directorates. This is required by the uniform interpretation and teaching of Marxism.

Our ties with the sister organizations have been close from the beginning. There has been a qualitative change in them during recent years. Previously, help consisted mostly of our teachers regularly going over to the educational directorate to give lectures and to lead workshops. There is less need for this now since the directorates can attend to their duties by themselves.

Other methods of helping have come about. The departments of our academy--jointly with departments of the state universities--develop the teaching program for the various subjects, prepare the textbooks and compile the literature lists.

A regular advanced training of the teachers of the educational directorates is also our duty. And this is done in a very diversified form. They join the studies of the regular and corresponding students of our academy during the final 6th semester. Here they can study in depth the new results of their particular specialty. We also organize special advanced courses of 1 month duration and special lectures for them. The nationwide discussions and theoretical conferences organized jointly with the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the KB are very useful. Many teachers at the directorates receive their first academic degree and defended their doctoral dissertation with us. We frequently also organize discussions and consultations with the teachers at the directorates and we provide considerable methodological help to the departments of pedagogy there.

The help is mutual. Our academy also receives much help from them. The most important is that our future students meet the requirements of the admission examination. This essentially consists of a thorough knowledge of the material of the 3 year evening university which they attain through the efforts of the educational directorates. The educational directorate is also one of the sources of supply to our faculty.

[Question] Advancement and socialist development presents many problems not dealt with by classical Maxism-Leninism. These must be solved by the present Marxist-Leninist social sciences. Do these solutions reach the political education? What is the relationship between research activity and education?

[Bela Kopecki] I consider the 2,000 strong corps of teachers mentioned and the annual 60 thousand students as the politically most active strata of public opinion who must be the first ones to be informed about new results of the social sciences. Quite a number of social science fields, such as economics, sociology, demography, etc., also have a direct role in the preparation of political decisions. However, most of them contribute to correct decisions, their understanding and realization by developing a modern Marxist view.

To stay within this second train of thought, if we examine how the new results of social science research affect and--as a precondition of it--how they reach the societal mind, we cannot remain complacent. Therefore, I consider it very important that we build interactions, above all, with party education and through this with the politically most interested public. What means could be used? First is the participation of researchers in party education. The educational directorates should enlist the members of scientific research institutions as lecturers in larger numbers and more regularly. And not in basic education where the party teachers have much

greater experience. I refer rather to advanced education where it is both possible and necessary to teach the new results, to confront them with practice and with the basic tenets of Marxist theory. The other is that we struggle with the problem of frequently weak societal response to our research results. However, party educators and students could be demanding, attentive, knowledgeable and critical readers of our books, journal publications, and they could even find a way to express their opinions. Finally the third is that they should turn to the research institutes with current controversial questions. We could organize even more joint discussions than before.

The directorates should obviously build closer associations not only with the academic institutes but also with university departments, scholarly societies, the Historical Society and the Society for the Propagation of Academic Knowledge. Within a certain framework, the educational institutions themselves could also get more involved in research involving teachers, for instance, in the elaboration of certain topics or parts of a problem. Moreover, the students could also help, for instance, with sociological surveys and in the application of certain findings.

The building of bilateral relationships is undoubtedly hindered by the prejudice of some of the researchers. Many consider political education as some old type seminary or they think that, at best, it is restricted merely to the popular dissemination of the basic Marxist categories. But those researchers who also carry out educational work and are acquainted with the current situation in party education, are free of such prejudices and participate willingly in such activity.

[Istvan Kurucz] At the Budapest directorate, we are in an exceptionally favorable position in this respect. Many outstanding scientists and researchers are also our fellow educators. And just as we cannot do without their great knowledge and participation in our teaching, training and educational work, nor can they in their academic activities do without that which the training possibilities offers them such as practice, reality, the constant encounter and confrontation with problems arising in life. There is another advantage. Within the faculties of educational directorates, and at the teacher meetings, researchers representing different professional orientation often meet with each other. Here they get better acquainted with each other and can exchange opinions.

[Gyula Mona] The scientific research activities of our educational directorates are obviously limited because their calling as educators cannot be endangered by overloading. However, the incorporation of new research findings into education is an important condition in raising the standards. We are already past the initial steps. Most recently there has evolved in the educational directorates a certain pedagogic-methodological and sociological research activity. Even more important than this is that theoretical conferences are being held in Budapest and in the provincial towns to utilize recent findings in the social sciences. The program encompasses 18 to 20 topics.

[Question] In conclusion, perhaps the most important aspect is how the work of the educational directorates is utilized in the development of the given fields, in political activity, and in the solution of national economic and social fields?

[Gyorgy Ekler] Considering their broad range of social effects, the educational directorates play a large role in realizing party policy in all areas uniformly and as effectively as possible. It is generally known that Szabolcs-Szatmar Megye has corrected very considerable disadvantages within the most recent decades. Our megye party committee could not have supplied the guidance and organization for this development without the help of the educational directorate. We have also received direct help. For instance in the 1970's, when the social transition and modernization of socialist agriculture became more forceful, industrialization and urbanization developed, and large masses took the road toward becoming workers. Our megye party committee was faced with a large series of new problems. We could not have solved them without the new social science findings built on the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. This was done, above all, through mediation by the educational directorates. We did not ask the educators to initiate independent research and to rediscover laws already discovered elsewhere long ago. But rather we asked that they adapt creatively, to the peculiarities of the megye, the experiences and results related to the social processes mentioned; that with their studies they could help to prepare implement decisions involving the megye.

[Tibor Ungor] The same was repeatedly requested from us by the Szolnok Megye party committee. In accordance, we have carried out our sociological studies, for instance, on the socialist changes of peasant consciousness or on the changes in the political and ethical profile of the workers. These and similar studies have also appeared in various volumes.

[Gyorgy Ekler] But this is still not the greatest help because it is even more important that the educational directorate is improving the political preparedness of middle-level social officials and economic leaders year by year. People are needed who, with adequate Marxist education and attitude, and in possession of the new social science knowledge, are able to lead--with a broad scope--the daily work of plants, basic party organizations, and the state and mass organizational organs. This is the most important personal requirement for the successful implementation of our policy.

Two facts should be mentioned. Since the 11th Congress, there has been a 15 percent increase in the political schooling of the party membership of Szabolcs-Szatmar Megye. And about 75 percent of the middle level leadership already has at least a night university or some corresponding political education.

[Gyula Mona] Considering everything, the educational directorates have reached adulthood. They are raising, training and giving advanced training to leaders who can satisfy the growing demands of our present and future, who are prepared and able to implement successfully the tasks enumerated at the 12th Congress.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Thus the standards of activity by the educational directorates have increased considerably and their interaction with the present Marxist social science research activities is becoming increasingly active. Proportionately they are held in increasing esteem by the party membership and broader public opinion.

IMPORTANCE, CHARACTER OF SECONDARY INCOMES VIEWED

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 29 Mar 80 p 5

[Article by Tamas Kilosi: "The 'Incidental' Is Not Incidental"]

[Text] We all work. Because we do not always go home immediately after work, we have learned to supplement. I toil, you work on the side, he is self-employed, we augment our income, you are corrupt, they steal. Concepts have arisen: supplementary economy, hidden economy, secondary distribution, etc. Reason, emotion and even preconceptions are some of the active midwives of these concepts.

First came the traditional research: into the operating principles of socialist economy by Istvan R. Gabor and Peter Galasi; into distribution and deduction of income, by Zsuzsa Ferge; into corruption, by Elemér Hankiss' and by myself into the examination of social structure. Then came the publicism: Sandor Erdelyi's ordogszekere [Devil's Cart] in "Valóság," Ferenc Kunszabo's [kalikaja] in several places, and more recently, the debate between György Asperjan and Miklós Hernádi in "Élet és Irodalom," and Eva Pusztai's article, "Lehangolt Csodavárak" [Dejected Expedition of Miracles] in the 1 March issue of ES. Nevertheless, public opinion is conjugating [ragoz], and--true to custom--the subject which existed in the streets for a long time finally fought its way to the decision tables of the state and political organs. We are discussing it.

But what are we talking about?

Waiters, I believe, have been receiving gratuities ever since there have been waiters. Prevailing shortages have spawned the black market directly. Corruption extends from the Moricz Relatives [Rokonok] to Korneagata to Abdulgate to the American senators. Ever since through the struggles of the worker movements and state intervention the working hours have been shortened from "sunup to sundown," it has become possible to do work outside of the main working hours. In fact, in certain Western European countries employment of this sort, concealed from taxation, is performed by 10-20 percent of the wage earners. Thus, this phenomenon is hardly of recent origin, or hardly peculiar to socialism. Of course, under the conditions of socialism they

have a substantially different appearance--and not primarily because of moral sanctions.

By the 1960's, state and cooperative enterprise management clearly became predominant. Along with this, the directive characteristics and (partly) functional disorders of state and cooperative management appeared more distinctly--overrecruitment of labor, centralized deductions, and the average wage level (which was the result of the previous two factors), recurring shortages in the agricultural system, the interest system, private owner interests and lapses in motivation. For all practical purposes, only the large enterprise forms of socialist economic organizations were developed. The Hungarian economy has become overly centralized and overly concentrated. Nevertheless, quite a few socially and economically necessary activities--on the given technological level--cannot be economically performed, especially within the large enterprise framework. Dynamic economic development and the discernable rise in the standard of living for all social levels contributed to all this by creating a solvent demand. On the other side of the coin, the individual to make money was motivated: to accept additional work.

The economy, society and individuals reacted to these challenges in different ways. Some tried to maximize their incomes through their main occupation, and some tried to do the same outside of the state and cooperative enterprise framework. There were those--the overwhelming majority--who accomplished this through additional work. There were those who tried to exploit the advantages of their positions. Others--perhaps not even very few--resorted to illegal means. Even economic and social policy reacted to these challenges, but naturally, since they were attempting to reconcile various interests, not without inconsistencies. Perhaps the history of small scale agriculture and household farming illustrate the driving trends of these reactions most noticeably. Here conscious social planning--the roots of which reach back to Lenin--automatically counted on a combination of large scale and small plot production.

It would be worthwhile to ponder sometime how much the large farms not burdened with less profitable tasks contributed to the success of Hungarian agriculture and of production cooperatives. We were, and are still expecting the solution--at least in this case--from households and supplementary farms. At the same time, small plot agricultural production also illustrates how within the framework of socialist large scale production a sphere, which is legally integrated into socialist production, can be created by the labor force and other capacities not elsewhere utilizable can be exploited to fulfill an economically and socially necessary function.

Various reactions have arisen to this (self-created) challenge of the socialist economy. However, these diverse reactions became intertwined and intermingled, sometimes in reality, sometimes in the process of evaluation. Occasionally, moonlighting appeared to be the chief enemy. At other times, corruption seemed to be the mainspring of our development, or at least the chief income source for many. Nevertheless, we must clearly differentiate between fraud,

theft and corruption, and the earning activities and income redistribution which are related to actual, not state or cooperative organized, need fulfilling and socially desirable second jobs.

The broadest area of secondary employment is in agriculture, in household and supplementary farming. One-third of agricultural production--with the aid of the cooperatives--is carried out here. These occupy one-half of the labor performed in agriculture, and affect nearly a half of the population, from the production aspect. To the 1.7 million households with small plots belong 2.2 million active wage earners, .7 million pensioners and another 2.2 million auxiliary family members as dependents. Of the active wage earners, not quite 600,000 are manual laborers for agricultural cooperatives. More than a million are industrial or construction workers. Only one-quarter of these households are so-called peasant households.

Nearly a half of private and vacation home building, one-third of housing maintenance and nearly two-thirds of service and repair work are being carried on through the supplementary economy. In private and vacation home building 150-200,000, in housing maintenance nearly 100,000, in clothing, metal-technical, automobile, electric device and communications technology repair 100-110,000, in personal services (hairstresser, photographer) nearly 10,000 persons receive incomes by moonlighting. The annual incomes derived from these can be estimated to be nearly 7-8 billion forints. Thus, nearly 400,000 persons are increasing their incomes by the average of 1,600-1,800 forints a month. While we have no data on the distribution of these earnings by income group, presumably the deviation from the average is relatively small.

According to some estimates, before the new regulations which went into effect recently, 15 percent of the university educated (nearly 30,000 persons) and 8 percent of the secondary school educated (80,000 persons) had incomes from second jobs, sideline activities and occasional work. An additional 30-40,000 persons have incomes from creative and independent intellectual activities--those with relatively higher incomes can be found in this category. In the absence of exact data, the number of families deriving profit from renting apartments and vacation homes can be estimated at 200,000. Of these, however, at least a half realize less than 1,000 forints a month supplementary income. High income (around 50,000 forints) is derived in this way only by perhaps some 10,000 families. The approximately 6-8 billion forints of gratuity income earned by the 250-300,000 individuals who work in gratuity professions increases their incomes from their main employment one-and-one-half to two-fold. Of these, nearly 17-18,000 work in commerce, 42,000 in hospitality, 16-18,000 in health services, 38-40,000 in other areas (mail, collection, public sanitation and interment). For a significant portion of these workers, pay is automatically so calculated that it reaches the national average wage levels when taken together with gratuities. Monthly incomes surpassing 10,000 forints appear in larger proportions only in a few areas (doctors, lawyers, used car parts dealers, truck rental drivers, gas station attendants and AFIT [Industrial Trust for Auto Maintenance] managers).

Moonlighting can be connected to the main employment and with state and cooperative enterprises. Of the 3 million engaged in manual labor, nearly a million engage in overtime with varying regularity nearly 320,000, less than 6 hours per month, a half million, from 6-30 hours per month, and 180,000, more than 30 hours per month. (Four times as many men than women work overtime.) As far as the individual is concerned, the regular overtime of the last group differs very little from the previously mentioned additional work.

Finally, according to labor force statistics, in 1978 there were 63,000 of working age, non-student male dependents. A significant portion of these are occasional employees in the supplementary economy. Their position, at certain times only, is similar to the position of those who spend longer than one month between jobs because of changing their place of employment. The income of these probably ranges around 5-6,000 forints.

Thus overall, nearly 3-3 1/2 million active wage earners and 1-1 1/2 million pensioners and dependents are participating in the above detailed activities. Upon analyzing the activity structure, we find that 10-15 percent of the managers, 30-40 percent of the white collar workers, one-quarter of other intellectuals, 40-50 percent of nonagricultural manual laborers, 75-80 percent of agricultural workers and 40 percent of the inactive (pensioners) regularly perform work on the side.

Because regular performance of sideline work by women--except in agriculture--because of the family division of labor, is less frequent, we may interpret the data to mean that 70-75 percent of families have more or less income from the above mentioned activities. Although we have no picture at all of the distribution, we may perhaps still risk stating that 25-30 percent of families do not have any income of this sort. For another 50-55 percent, this extra income makes the reaching of approximately the average financial situation possible. There are only some 10,000 families which, under current domestic conditions, have unusually high incomes.

The data otherwise indicate that participation in income activities and income redistribution in addition to main employment is not differentiated according to social level. Every group has more or less opportunities to participate. The appearance of those in a given specific occupational group in a certain activity, and the degree of their participation therein depend primarily on their professional qualifications, their background, their traditions, on domestic conditions and on given factors--for example, whether they own a small plot. In addition, it is also related to material living conditions, such as for example, whether they have an apartment yet. Naturally, because the opportunities for acquiring income vary. The willingness factors are not the only ones to determine income differentiation.

In a half of the families which are not involved in the supplementary economy, there are wage earners who earn more than the average (such are, for example, miners, metal workers, male workers in the paper industry and certain white collar workers). For these, not being part of the secondary

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economy does not present serious problems, at least not on the materially. (Subjectively, the resistance is probably strongest here because many can acquire the well paying positions of these levels through "round-about means.") However, for 10-20 percent of the families, wherein the low primary incomes are not supplemented, being outside of the secondary economy can be a cause of serious problems.

For 40-50 percent of the families--this is the majority of the families of manual laborers--it is possible to maintain an about average standard of living and to save for social necessities (apartment building, the purchase of durable consumer goods) through additional work. Fifteen to twenty percent of the families of manual workers achieve relatively higher incomes through supplementary activities. This results in their surpassing the incomes of the lowest level of white collar workers (this is 20-25 percent). At the same time, the minority of white collar families--partly through high income main positions, and partly through other income--have exceptional incomes by today's standards. (The majority of these, however, because of the distinguished activities of those concerned, are socially necessary and are approved.)

Thus, the supplementary activities and the redistribution of incomes approved through social custom are increasing income differentiation. Their role, however, is more of a "rearranger" than a fosterer of strata differences. In any case, they greatly affect occupational prestige, life style, and by mediating these, they affect the structure of society. In occupational prestige, for example, gratuities have a modifying role. It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasize this role. In the overwhelming majority of occupations, the chance for gratuities does not enhance the occupation's prestige, nor is it able to counteract the negative elements. (For example, in the case of trash collection, loaders-haulers, truck drivers, funeral and postal workers.) In other occupational groups the chances for additional income contributes to the relatively high prestige of the occupations only when taken together with additional factors. The high prestige of the doctor is not determined by the gratuity or private consultation, nor is that of the television repairman by the chances for income. The cosmetician has higher prestige than the hairdresser, although their incomes are similar. In all probability, the relatively high income has a relatively determinate role in only a few occupations. (A typical example is the filling station attendant.)

In the relationships between additional work and lifestyle, the negative effect on lifestyle derived from the extra time devoted and from distortions of the activity structure are often emphasized. While it is apparent that the form of the extra work fundamentally determines the individual's activity structure, participation in additional work for many is in fact an economic necessity. However, the income thus derived can also have a favorable effect on lifestyle, because it can create the possibility for normal living conditions through, let us say, creating the material conditions for a cultured lifestyle. In reality, the case is not that if broad social groups

did not work more than the weekly 44 hours, they would participate in more cultural activities. It is just the opposite--their opportunities for living a cultured life would even be less than they are now. Thus it follows that extra work affects the character of lifestyle, not its quality.

Thus, the so-called supplementary economy is a modifying factor in the social structure. For certain (large) population groups--rural population, gratuity professions--it is one of the important factors of social status. The impossibility of partaking in it and the exceptionally good opportunities within respectively are increasing the distance between the extreme poles of society to some degree. The effect the supplementary economy has on the income situation is loosening the rigidity of social stratification. It contributes to the disappearance of boundaries between the upper categories of manual laborers and the lower level of white collar workers. Thus it would be erroneous and a false oversimplification to stress only the unfavorable effects flowing from it.

Of course, these unfavorable tendencies, just as corruption, theft, fraud and speculation do exist. In fact, society and public opinion differentiate between the bribe given (or received) for under the counter shortage items and the civil servant's occasional income from corruption; between spare parts which can still be used at home, stolen from the plant dump, and embezzlement. New concepts have arisen--it is their nature to multiply by division, tertiary distribution, fourth economy...ad infinitum.

It would be more sensible to try to do some differentiation rather than to revel among disorderly concepts. The fact that the boundaries are difficult to define is indisputable, since some of the illegal phenomena are related to work performed in moonlighting--houses are also built from materials stolen from plants. Sometimes it is difficult to differentiate between a gratuity and a bribe. The majority of illegal actions and transactions, however, do not belong here, but rather to the state and cooperative spheres. Occasionally, illegal actions "correct" regulation shortcomings or economic inflexibility; in other cases they are consequences of overregulation (for example, in the case of gasoline coupons, when a "payment method" different from the daily practice makes manipulation possible).

We should not be seeking concepts for these phenomena, but with an understanding of the causes, we should take action against them through administrative means, with the law in all its rigor, and even more by making our economy and institutions more flexible, and by elimination (gradual) of shortages. Who would give a bribe for something which is available at the next corner without it? Who would risk stealing a tool out of and back into the factory if it could be rented when not in use?

At the same time, however, I believe it would be worthwhile to vigorously support the integration of income activities additional to main employment into the socialist economy. It should be done, if for no other reason, than that we have an indispensable need for the products and services

originating here. We have a need for the food, housing and services produced through additional work. While our apartments are happily being "mechanized," the small machines need occasional repair. Our foreigner [tourist] traffic is increasing, but the foreigners must have some place to stay, and stay comfortably. We must seek out--small farming gives many good examples to follow--the forms (for example, the lease system) with the aid of which the socially useful and necessary activities, while retaining their essence, may become integrated parts of an economy which is becoming ever more flexible.

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CSO: 2500

## DEVELOPMENTS, SHIFTING U.S. STRATEGY IN MIDDLE EAST OBSERVED

Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 10 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Tadeusz Pioro: "Stormy Time for Asia"]

[Text] A distinct aggravation has taken place in the Persian Gulf situation. The break by the United States in diplomatic relations with Iran which was intensified by economic sanctions as well as by Khomeyni's unusually sharp reaction (who, nota bene, considered the action as a manifestation of American helplessness) has coincided with the aggravation of relations between Iran and Iraq leading to the placement of troops on the border between those states on alert.

At the same time, Egypt's granting asylum to the former Shah of Iran is also not without significance for these events, as are the muddled relations between Egypt and Israel linked with Israel's increasing takeover of Palestinian lands. Carter's discussions with Sadat and Begin in the USA on this subject cannot but have an impact on the situation as a whole which has arisen in the Persian Gulf area. It is also a fact that this area has now become the principal axis around which relationships are assuming shape under new conditions between the United States and Western European states, between the United States and Arab countries, as well as between the Arab states themselves located on the Gulf: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and United Arab Emirates.

A new era was to have begun for the Near East in 1918. The State of Oman which had reigned there for hundreds of years fell in ruins; national Arab forces were to have taken to the reshaping of this area into their own hands. History, however, proceeded otherwise: West European powers, breaking their own promises, imposed their rule, though in different form, and in substantial measure checked the political, economic and cultural development of the Arab world. In addition, Great Britain added its bit: having contributed to the creation of the Israeli state in 1948, it left the seeds of conflict in the Near East which developed but good when colonialism ceased to exist there.

The destructive potential of the Near East conflict negatively affects the fate of this area to this day. Israel's aggressive policy has effectively ruined any kind of political, social, philosophical and even human consensus

which could become the bases of a new national revival that the Arab world has dreamed about. The Palestinians lost their lands, an event reminiscent of the seizure of the Holy Land by the Crusaders 900 years ago. The Israelis, on the other hand, managed to expand their ownership beyond the boundaries laid out in the partition determined by the United Nations. Along with this, it turned out--and this is most important--that the Arab states were in no condition to act in concert. The resolution of this situation, characterized by the rise of the United States bringing pressure on the Near East, became the primary cause of Arab leader activity; at the same time, this situation disclosed the whole complexity of the Arab world's consolidation process.

The fact, that in the 1970's the Arab states attained a position within the framework of OPEC which made it possible for them to make decisions relative to political and economic aspects of oil production, was evaluated by them not only as a decisive step in gaining complete independence, but also as a change in the structure of power in the Middle East to Israel's disadvantage. However, the power structure in the Persian Gulf has recently experienced two upheavals. After the 1977 Camp David agreements, Egypt "left the game" and from that moment the entire picture of the Arab-Israeli conflict changed. The second convulsion was the Iranian revolution as a result of which countries on the Persian Gulf found themselves between the power of Khomeini's influence and American helplessness in resolving the Iranian, actually the entire Near East problem, if the matter of American hostages is considered on that level.

Five small Persian Gulf States (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) are in no position either to politicize or to defend themselves unaided. Their continuance is in no small measure dependent on the alignment of forces between the big powers, as well as on relations between the local powers of medium rank: Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the seeds of the conflict which have arisen on the Iranian border as well as the increase of tension in American-Iranian relations place the small states of this region in a difficult and uncertain position.

The events taking place in the Persian Gulf cannot be treated as a regional problem isolated from those occurring in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. All of these countries, irrespective of their relationships with their neighbors, are set in the vast geographical background, where the situation has an impact not only on foreign policy, but also on the internal policy of the countries named. Of themselves recent American political and military measures against Iran evoke consequences which spread far beyond the Near East area.

It is possible today to recognize the changes in American strategy in this area of the world.

Action to date has been based on the principle that the armed might of the USA ought to stay out of the area, meddling so to speak, "from beyond the horizon." For more than 20 years successive administrations in Washington most willingly accepted the policy of supplying arms and dispatching military

advisers rather than creating their own bases in this area. The bastion of American policy was the Iran of Reza Pahlavi, and pressure on other countries was exerted from Teheran.

Currently, regardless of action directed against Iran, the USA advances the possibility of the Soviet Union's drawing closer to the Arabian Sea and countries on the Persian Gulf, and in this perceives a threat to American rule in the Indian Ocean. Thus, there emerges a linkage of USA strategy in the southern part of Asia with strategy on the ocean expanse which Washington wants to consider as the domain of its activity. Simultaneously, increasing American-Egyptian contacts, White House representatives' trips to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Somalia in search of bases required for newly created interventionist forces, promises of increasing arms shipments to Pakistan, and finally expanding cooperation with China, all show an intent to create a new chain of states cooperating militarily and politically with the United States, and directed against the USSR.

With the development of detente, the chain of American bases surrounding the Soviet Union was thinned out and some of its elements were eliminated completely. The possibility that the USSR will shortly find itself facing an increase in the number of bases in Asia cannot, however, be excluded. This is undoubtedly a threat which will bring the detente structure raised with such difficulty to naught, a structure based on rather unstable foundations even without that.

Is it possible that the time is again coming in which elements of rivalry will dominate over elements of cooperation? It could be. It could, however, be that the forces of peace will prevail over the forces disturbing that peace, and that the world will again enter that stream of unending quarrels, but without the "rattle of the sword."

10433

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## ROMAN CHARACTER OF DOBROGEA STRESSED

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 7, 5 Apr 80 pp 34-36

[Article by Dr Petre Diaconu, Bucharest Institute of Archeology: "Dobrogea, an Integral Part of the Abode of Formation and Continuity of the Romanian People"]

[Text] Judging from the literary data and archeological data, it can be said that the Geto-Dacians--the northern branch of the great tribe of Thracians--lived in a vast geographical area, bounded on the south by the Haemus (Balkan) Mountains and on the north by the Sylvan Carpathians. The eastern and western limits of this area are harder to define. At any rate, as far as is known thus far, the Geto-Dacian civilization extended eastward at least to the Nistru River and westward to the Tisa Plain. History also puts within these limits the centralized and independent Dacian state under the leadership of Burebista, the creation of which--2,050 years ago--we will be celebrating in a short while.

The region between the Danube and the Black Sea, corresponding to the Dobrogea of our times, was also included in this area. The fact is verified by the character of the settlements and necropolises from the early (Hallstatt) Iron Age and the late (La Tene) Iron Age.

Over the centuries, the Geto-Dacian communities in Dobrogea manifested themselves on all planes of social-economic and political-military life. This we learn from the literary sources, Greek inscriptions and archeological documents. From the archeological data it follows that the first contacts between the civilization of the Geto-Dacians on our homeland's territory and the Mediterranean civilization were made through Dobrogea. It was the first of our homeland's regions that entered into the composition of the Roman provinces on the Danube. Belonging to Moesia, it was transformed into a Roman province as early as 46 A.D.

Along with the establishment of Roman control, there came into being, besides the Geto-Dacian centers, new rural and urban centers, organized on the model of those in the rest of the empire. The Roman life in Dobrogea--reflected in the written sources, in the epigraphic and archeological

documents--could have no other result than the Romanization of this region. In the third century A.D., Dobrogea was a Roman territory from all viewpoints. The Latin language was spoken everywhere and by everyone.

Being Romanized, Dobrogea too became, in its turn, one of the factors in Romanizing the Geto-Dacian regions across the Danube. Here is not the place to dwell on the Roman and Romanizing character of Dobrogea. The fact has been known for a long time. We will confine ourselves just to pointing out that, of all the provinces of our country, Dobrogea stayed the longest within the Roman Empire. Moreover, it was also to continue to belong to the empire in the interval between the fourth and sixth centuries, an era in which its state organizations had begun to acquire a Byzantine coloring.

The transformation of the Eastern Roman Empire into the Byzantine Empire did not entail significant changes in the demographic and ethnic aspect of Dobrogea, known then under the name of the province of Scythia Minor. The Romanized population in Scythia Minor was a historical reality, just as its unbroken ties with the local population in the north Danubian region were also a historical reality. Moreover, this was one of the main characteristics of Dobrogea's history throughout the following centuries.

Beginning with the fourth century, Dobrogea was subjected to the attack of tribes in migration: Goths, Huns, Kutrigurs, Avars, Slavs and so on. Scythia Minor had to be defended at any cost, since its loss was equivalent to the elimination of the empire's political and economic interests on the lower Danube. Consequently, the old Roman camps on the right bank of the Iстру and even those within the province were fortified.<sup>1</sup> Procopius informs us that even the villages were fortified. In short, the line of the Danube on the right side of Dobrogea was prepared to repel any attack. The pressure of the Slavic tribes on the move in the sixth and seventh centuries did not manage to break it. In consequence, the Slavic tribes, in order to be able to enter the Balkan Peninsula, had to go around Scythia Minor and cross the Danube at the fords west of Durostorum. Our assertion is confirmed by the finding that settlements and necropolises of an early Slavic type did not exist in the Dobrogea of the sixth-seventh centuries, in contrast with the region in northeastern Bulgaria, where they were frequently encountered.

Dobrogea also continued to be controlled by the Byzantines in most of the seventh century. This follows from the remarks of the chronicler Theophanes. Referring to the Byzantine-Bulgarian battles occurring in 680 somewhere on the lower Danube, the above-mentioned chronicler specified that, around 680, this area--that is, the zone of the battles--was the "Christians'."<sup>2</sup> Of course, the Christians to whom Theophanes referred were none other than the Byzantines.

Who controlled Dobrogea in the eighth-ninth centuries? The little information existing justifies the assertion that the mouths of the Danube and the surrounding area also continued to be under Byzantine authority after 680.

Right at the start of the eighth century, former Emperor Justinian II, going from Chersonese, where he was exiled, to Constantinople, in order to regain his usurped throne, stopped for a time at the mouth of the Istru.<sup>3</sup> It stands to reason that if the Byzantines had not controlled the river's delta, Justinian II would not have been able to stay there. From the remarks of the chroniclers regarding the arrival there of the Byzantine fleet, in many ranks, with a clear intention of attacking the Bulgarian state in the northern region, it is also concluded that the river's delta was in the hands of the Byzantines in the eighth century.<sup>4</sup> In Byzantium's history it never happened--and would not have been possible--that the Constantinopolitan fleet came to the lower Danube without the empire having certain naval bases there. One of these bases had to be at Lykostonn, a fact verified for the ninth century by a statement of Patriarch Photius, recorded in his "Lexikon."<sup>5</sup> Consequently, there is every reason to acknowledge that the Byzantines controlled the mouths of the Danube in the eighth-ninth centuries. And whoever controlled the mouths of the Danube also had control of the adjacent regions, such as, for instance, the northern part of Dobrogea.

The Bulgarian state with the capital at Pliska did not manage to control the northern half of the former province of Scythia Minor even in the times of its maximum expansion. This is the place to mention that of the nearly 100 Bulgarian inscriptions known thus far--we are referring to the inscriptions from the 9th century--not one was found in Dobrogea north of Dristra. However it may be, in the ninth century, when the Bulgarian state was at the height of its territorial development, its control in Dobrogea extended, at most, to the line of the walls that cross the region between Axiopolis (Cernavoda) and Tomis (Constanta). There is no longer any doubt that the big earth wall was erected in the 9th century<sup>6</sup> and the stone wall in the 10th century.<sup>7</sup> Since the ends of the walls go around the ports of Axiopolis (on the bank of the Danube) and Tomis (on the shore of the Black Sea), it follows that the political power north of the line that goes through the middle of Dobrogea was the beneficiary of a fleet. However, in the 9th-10th centuries, the only naval power in this part of Europe was that of Byzantium. Hence too the conclusion that Byzantium controlled northern Dobrogea in those times.

Obviously, we must not think that the Constantinopolitan Empire exercised its authority in Dobrogea as it had exercised it earlier, by means of an administration held together also with the help of garrisons quartered in camps and subordinate to a strategus. Nor would it have been possible as long as Byzantium had to cope, on a domestic plane, with the disputes started by iconoclasm and, on a foreign plane, with the pressure of the Arabs, the Bulgarians, the Khazars and so on. Under such conditions, the control of the Byzantines on the lower Danube was exercised by means of their strong fleet while their authority was grafted onto the existence of the local population, Romanized centuries before.

The Byzantine administration, in its classic forms, was reestablished in Dobrogea toward the end of the 10th century, more precisely, in 971, along

with the defeat at Dorostola (Dristra), the former *Durostorum*, of the Alevan-Varangian troops, which had entered the region of the lower Danube several years earlier. Beginning with 971, the territory of Dobrogea was included in a Byzantine theme (province), called *Paradounavon* (*Paristrion*) in the 11th century. In consequence, military units formed of soldiers recruited, according to custom, from the local population were installed in the Roman camps on the right bank of the Danube, sometimes rebuilt from the ground up. The Byzantines were not content just with rebuilding the old Danubian camps. Where they saw fit, they built new cities. Such a city was built on the Danubian island of *Pacuiul lui Soare*. The city on the island of *Pacuiul lui Soare* had the mission of serving as a naval base for the Byzantine fleet entrusted with supervision of the Danube. The commander of the Byzantine army in Dobrogea was, simultaneously, also the governor of the province. His residence was in Dristra.

In the 11th century, Dobrogea was invaded several times by the old Turkish populations: Petchenegs, Uzes and Cumans. Thus, in 1036, the Petchenegs crossed the Danube three times, devastating everything that they found on the way. On this occasion, the existence of the fortified settlements in *Capidava* and *Derwent* ceased, while the majority of the dwellings in *Dinogetia-Garvan* were set on fire. The settlement in *Dinogetia-Garvan* also had to suffer from the incursion of the Uzes in the winter of 1064-1065. And then, as in 1036, the dwellings in *Dinogetia-Garvan* fell prey to fire. In 1094, it was the turn of the Cumans to pounce upon Dobrogea.

Despite the hardships of the times, the local population continued to live its life in the patterns cut out many centuries before. While some were occupied with agriculture and cattle breeding, as well as fishing, others were occupied with the craft of metal-, wood-, bone- and stoneworking. Finally, not few were those who practiced trade. Moreover, the exchanges of goods had attained in those times a level never encountered in the eastern half of Europe. Goods coming from all parts of Europe and even farther away, from Central Asia, the region of the Persian Gulf and so on, crossed paths there, in the Dobrogea of those times.

Of whom was the population formed? The literary sources<sup>8</sup> permit the assertion that, besides Romanians, the descendants of the Romanian population, from whom the place names of *Vicina*, *Baroi*, *Oltina*, *Lristra*<sup>9</sup> and so on came to us, there were Greeks (it is known just that the region was controlled by the Byzantines), Bulgarians, Petchenegs, Uzes and so on. The presence of so many different peoples besides Romanians has its explanation. Some (the Bulgarians and the Greeks) were attracted by the natural conditions, favorable to economic activities, and others (the Petchenegs and the Uzes) were the remnants of the populations that made invasions into the Balkan Peninsula.

The literary sources offer us little information about the situation of Dobrogea in the 12th century, but it is enough for us to realize that this province also belonged to Byzantium then. The archeological discoveries

made in Dinogetia-Garvan, Niculitel, Noviodunum-Isaccea and Troesmis-Iglita eloquently confirm the few literary references.

An analysis of the literary, archeological, geographical and numismatic documents justifies the conclusion that the emergence of vast south Danubian territories from under the trusteeship of Constantinople, as a result of the insurrection in 1185-1186, did not at all mean the loss of Dobrogea and the mouths of the Danube by the Byzantines.

During the reign of Isaac II Angelus (1185-1195), the Byzantine fleet was found at the mouth of the Danube. Moreover, the Byzantine presence on the lower Danube in those times is also indicated by the discovery at Isaccea of two lead seals with the name of Emperor Isaac II Angelus. Naturally, the seals accompanied some letters of the basileus that were sent to a strategus or a Byzantine high official in that part of Dobrogea. To these documents are added the observations of an archeological and numismatic order obtained in the scientific investigations made at Dinogetia-Garvan, Noviodunum-Isaccea, Troesmis-Iglita, Nufarul and so on, which all show that Dobrogea continued to be administered by the Byzantines at the end of the 12th century and the start of the 13th century. In 1200, Varna was under Byzantine control,<sup>10</sup> and Dristra was not yet the Asena's. Not controlling these two cities, the Romanian-Bulgarian state, with the capital in Tirnova, was not able to control Dobrogea.

For the 1st half of the 13th century, Dobrogea's history does not benefit from any direct literary information. And, nonetheless, starting from the finding that Byzantine money circulated in this region, especially in the above-mentioned period, it can be asserted--with severe reservations--that in those times too the region between the Danube and the Black Sea was, in one way or another, under Byzantine influence. Moreover, if the list of the dioceses in the 1st half of the 13th century, in which Dristra is mentioned as a Byzantine metropolitan see,<sup>11</sup> proves to reflect the strict reality, then our reservations will no longer have any justification. Regarding the 2d half of the 13th century, a number of sources permit the conclusion that in this period too the Byzantines also politically controlled Dobrogea.

Many sources argue for the Byzantine character of the control of Dobrogea in the 2d half of the 13th century and the early decades of the 14th century. It is now a well-known fact that Vicina, a city famous at the end of the 13th century and the start of the next century for the exchanges of goods there, was in Dobrogea. However, in the Genoese documents concluded in Pera it is mentioned--and more than once--that Vicina was in the "Romanic" Empire.

The Byzantine presence in Dobrogea is verified by the very existence of the metropolitan see of Vicina. In order to make ourselves completely understood, we will draw attention to a situation characteristic of Byzantine-Bulgarian relations in the 13th and 14th centuries. It is known that along with the founding of the patriarchate of Tirnovo (around 1235) none of the episcopates and metropolitan sees subordinate to the patriarchate of Constantinople could exist any longer in a territory controlled by the Bulgarians, just as none of the episcopates and metropolitan sees subordinate to the patriarchate of Tirnovo could exist any longer in a territory controlled by the Byzantines. However, if the metropolitan see of Vicina was--as is very well known--under the authority of the patriarchate of Constantinople, it follows that the territory of Dobrogea, over which it exercised its ecclesiastical authority, was a territory controlled by the Byzantines. It is to be noted that at one time the metropolitan bishop of Vicina began to have the powers of a true political leader, of a provincial governor--to express ourselves in modern terms. So it is explained why, in 1302, the few thousands of "Alans," leaving the north Pontic steppes with the intention of moving into a Byzantine region, treated not with a stratagem but with Vicina's metropolitan bishop himself, a certain Luk.<sup>14</sup>

Naturally, Byzantium exercised its authority in Dobrogea under the shelter of its good relations with the Tatars on the north Pontic steppes and in Crimea. Moreover, it is known that, throughout the presence of a Tatar power in eastern Europe, the Byzantines tried to be on the best terms with them. In fact, it is a question of their traditional policy, on the lower Danube, of always being on friendly terms with one of the migratory populations. It is no less true that, when necessary, the Byzantines could also rely--in defending their interests on the lower Danube--on the help of the fleet of the Italian cities. In the case of Dobrogea, granting to the Genoese the right to carry on trade in Vicina, the Byzantines ensured themselves of, among other things, their help.

For unknown reasons, however, in the 3d decade of the 13th century, Byzantine-Tatar relations got so bad that Vicina was occupied by the Golden Horde. However, the temporary loss of Vicina did not also mean the loss of Dobrogea by the Byzantines. Nevertheless, their power and influence in the region between the Danube and the Black Sea had begun to weaken.

Under the conditions of the presence of the Tatars on the left bank of the lower Danube and the weakening of Byzantine authority, a new state formation--the despotate of the Balica brothers, Dobrotici (Dobrotita) and Theodor, with the capital in Caliacra--came into being in the southeastern part of Dobrogea. From the start, the rulers of this despotate were considered vassals of Byzantium. In 1346, their troops participated in the civil wars in the empire, siding with Anne of Savoy in her dispute with John Cantacuzene.<sup>15</sup> Around 1355, Dobrotici was the only ruler of the despotate of Caliacra. It is proved that the mouths of the Danube<sup>16</sup> and the zones adjacent to the right bank of the river were not within the borders of this despotate. Around 1370, another despotate, that in Dristra, ruled

by a certain Ion Terter, a son of Dobrotici, came into being.<sup>17</sup> This despotate was also under the subordination of Constantinople.

Some specialists, through an incomplete interpretation of the written sources, speak about Turkish control of Dobrogea before the control established by Romanian Valvode Mircea the Old. An exegesis of the literary sources, of all the sources, concerning the Dobrogea of the 2d half of the 14th century entitles us to assert that this province entered the control of the princes of Wallachia without having known Turkish control beforehand.

The rule of Dobrogea by Mircea the Old was as complete as it was effective. The money coined by the Romanian ruler began to circulate everywhere in the region between the Danube and the Black Sea. Charters recording situations in Dobrogea were issued. In essence, the rule of Mircea the Old came to legitimate officially a natural state of affairs. For this reason, perhaps, in 1407-1408, the population of Drisra understood to express its attachment to the Romanian ruler by means of an inscription drafted in his honor.<sup>18</sup>

A short time after the death of Mircea the Old, Dobrogea was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire and belonged to its composition for more than 450 years.

The main consequence of the establishment of Ottoman control in Dobrogea was the settlement there of Turkish colonists coming from Asia Minor and, later, of Tatars coming from the north Pontic steppes and from Crimea. In this period, the names of most Dobrogean localities were changed.

Nevertheless, the Romanians continued to live and to maintain their ethnic individuality, especially in the villages on the right bank of the Danube and in the vicinity of the shore of the Black Sea. From a catalog from around 1570<sup>19</sup> it follows that most of the non-Muslims in localities like Oltina, Garvan, Lunca Vita, Macin, Isaccea, Caraharman and so on were Romanians. They bore characteristic names: Radul, Mihnea, Craciun and so on. The foreign travelers who passed through the Dobrogea of the 17th-18th centuries constantly alluded to the existence of the Romanians.

Of course, the maintenance of the Romanian ethnic entity was possible only due to the unbroken ties between the inhabitants on the right and left sides of the Danube. Travel from one bank to another had to have been an extremely frequent phenomenon, since many villages that have one and the same name are found on one side of the river and the other: Coslogea-Coslogeni, Oltina-Oltina, Satu Nou-Satnoeni, Mirleanu-Mirleanu and so on.<sup>20</sup>

As in earlier centuries, the Romanians in the Dobrogea ruled by the Turks were occupied with agriculture and cattle breeding. Some of them were occupied with trade. As a result of the close contacts with the Romanians in Wallachia and Moldavia, the Dobrogean Romanians began to set up schools in

the native language. The existence of such a school in Cernavoda is pointed out in a document from the middle of the 18th century. The Romanian school in Turtucalia was set up in 1774, and the school in Silistra, run by Petre Mihail and, after him, by Costache Petrescu, a brilliant figure of Romanian culture in the Dobrogea of the last century, was set up in 1847. Other schools were set up in Parachiei (Raneasa), Beilis, Oltina and Ramova, not to mention those in northern Dobrogea. Many of the teachers came from the left side of the Danube, whence, moreover, the books and much financial aid also came. We have come to the era around the war of independence, in 1877-1878, at the end of which Dobrogea, a component part of the ancient Geto-Dacian abode, resumed its place, in a natural way, in the general process of emancipation of our homeland.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Procopius, "De Aedificitiis," IV, 7, 15.
2. Theophanes, "Chronographia," I, Leipzig, 1889, p 547.
3. Ibidem, p 572.
4. These events occurred in the time of Emperor Constantine V Copronymus (740-775).
5. "Pontes Historiae Daco-Romanae," II, Bucharest, 1970, pp 636-637.
6. Regarding the date of the erection of the big earth wall, see "Pence," IV, in "Studii si Comunicari de Istorie si Arheologie" /Studies and Papers on History and Archeology/, Tulcea, 1973-1975, pp 197-209.
7. Regarding the date of the construction of the stone wall, see STUDII, REVISTA DE ISTORIE, XV, 1962, 5, pp 1,215-1,222. The "small earth wall," built, in all probability, in the second half of the sixth century, is also found in this zone.
8. Attaliates, "Historia," Bonn, 1853, p 209.
9. We will note that all the place names from the 10th-11th centuries recorded in the written sources are of Romanian origin and, in some cases (Selina and Conopa), of Greek origin. The latter are always found at the seashore.
10. It was to be conquered by the Asens in 1202.
11. G. Parthey, "Hierocles, Synecdms et Notitia Episcopatum," reprinted in Amsterdam, 1967, pp 197-224.
12. In the "Hamilton 396" manuscript in the State Library in Berlin, published by B. Motzo, 1947, in Cagliari, it is mentioned that the

distance from Aspera, at the mouth of the Danube, to Vicina is 200 miles, which is equivalent to 347 km. The end of this distance takes us to Pacuiul lui Soare, about which it was supposed even before that it would have been Vicina.

13. "Geographica d'Abulfeda, Traduit par Reinaud," II, Paris, 1848, p 315.
14. "Pachymeres," II, Bonn, 1835, p 307.
15. "Ioan Cantacuzino," III, Bonn, 1831, pp 584-585. Cf. "Fontes Historiae Daco-Romanae," Bucharest, 1975, pp 490-493.
16. "Pontica," IV, Constanta, 1971, pp 371-377.
17. "Studii si Cercetari de Istorie Veche si Arheologie" [Studies and Research on Ancient History and Archeology], 29, 1978, 2, pp 185-201.
18. "Studia et Acta Orientalis," I, 1958, pp 239-247.
19. Published in IZVESTIA, Varna, VIII (XXIII), 1972.
20. "Pontica," X, Constanta, 1977, pp 59-63.

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## BRIEFS

TEACHERS ARRESTED--The Supreme Court of Croatia confirmed the decision of the investigative judge of the District Court in Zadar about the temporary arrest of Pavle Despot, age 44, born in Split, with residence in Zadar, who has been in prison for over a month. The District Public Prosecutor's Office indicted him on suspicion that he has committed criminal acts of hostile propaganda and that he has prevented official persons from performing official business. According to the indictment, Pavle Despot, on occasion of teaching a Serbo-Croatian class at the School Center for Trade and Tourism on the life of Silviije Strahimir Kranjcevic [Croatian poet, 1865-1908] presented maliciously and falsely the present socio-political conditions in the country. The students complained on the same day to the director of the center and while the director wrote records based on the students' statements, Despot tried to prevent him in this by offending him and by trying to attack him physically. Pavle Despot was sentenced 6 years ago by the Opstina Court in Zadar to 4 months in prison and was given a 2-year suspended sentence for the criminal act of provoking national intolerance. [Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 4 Apr 80 p 16]

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